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Aristotle’s Measurement Dilemma  
 
1. Introduction 
Aristotle is the first thinker in the Western tradition handed down to us who explicitly 
discusses the topic of measurement systematically within a context relevant for natu-
ral philosophy.
1
 His account of measurement is, nevertheless, very much an underex-
                                                          
1
 Of course the practise of measurement long preceded Aristotle, and had seen im-
portant developments in near Eastern cultures, in Egypt, Mesopotamia, etc. With re-
spect to the conceptual side of measurement – for reasons of space I only look at the 
Hellenistic world here – there are questions of measurement connected with natural 
philosophy to be found in earlier thinkers, for example, in Anaximander, where we 
find the distances between the earth, moon, and sun measured in terms of the earth 
radius or circumference, cf., for example, D. O’Brien, “Anaximander’s measure-
ments”, Classical Quarterly 17 (1967), pp. 423-432 and A. Gregory, Anaximander, a 
Re-assessment, London 2016. Also Heraclitus B 94 (which claims that the sun will 
not overstep his measure, otherwise the Erinyes, ministers of Justice, will find him 
out) and Diogenes of Apollonia B3 (telling us that the underlying substance has a 
measure of everything, of winter and summer, of night and day, of rains and winds, 
and of fair weather) can be seen in connection with natural philosophy. There proba-
bly was some discussion about measurement in the Pythagoreans, and Philolaos’ 
basic pair of limiters and unlimiteds may be related to a measurement context (see 
Philolaos fragments 1, 2, and 9A in C. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton (Cambridge 
1993), and G. Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom (Berkeley 1987), 276-278, who thinks 
that the Pythagorean idea that all things are numbers or are like numbers acted “as a 
stimulus to find those numbers, by measurement, in the phenomena”). But neither in 
Anaximander, nor in Heraclitus, Apollonius, or the Pythagoreans, as handed down to 
us, do we find a full account of what measurement requires and means.  
L. Elders, Aristotle’s Theory of the One - A Commentary on Book X of the 
Metaphysics [One] (Assen 1961). 71 thinks that we can explain “Aristotle’s enthusi-
asm for ‘measure’” only “by considering it as a remainder of Platonism”. However, 
while we find substantial discussions of measurement in Plato, especially in the 
Philebus and the Laws, it is there discussed mainly as a metaphysical and ethical no-
tion, and not as what we can see as a forerunner to contemporary measurement theory 
(in Philebus 55d ff. Plato uses measurement for a division of different sciences, and 
also the Laws sometimes mention measure in the context of the sciences, for example, 
in 746eff.; but again Plato is not developing any kind of a measurement theory there). 
In the Timaeus Plato uses the notion of a measure within the context of astronomy, 
but also here the notion of measurement is not further analysed, cf. my Natural Phi-
losophy in Ancient Greece - Logical, Methodological, and Mathematical Foundations 
for the Theory of Motion [Motion], chapter 6. We are provided with a kind of classifi-
cation of measurement in Republic VII (in 526cff. where Plato talks about geômetria 
2 
plored topic, with hardly any research done on it. The research there has been focuses 
on time as a measure of motion,
2
 but does not discuss Aristotle’s general account of 
measurement and how this general account informs his idea of time as a measure.  
This paper investigates Aristotle’s account of measurement in two respects. 
First, it reconstructs Aristotle’s account of measurement in his Metaphysics and 
shows how it connects to modern notions of measurement – it shows in how far Aris-
totle’s account can be seen as providing some basis for our contemporary notion of a 
measure and where the two come apart. Aristotle’s notion of measure is not simply 
the same as the one we are working with today, but it can be understood as a special 
case of our notion and thus, to some degree, as an important predecessor for a con-
temporary notion of measurement. Second, the paper demonstrates that while Aristo-
tle’s notion of measurement is a useful notion in general, it only works for simple 
measures. Consequently, it leads Aristotle into a dilemma once it comes to measuring 
complex phenomena, such as motion, where two or more different aspects have to be 
taken into account (in the case of locomotion, the temporal as well as the spatial as-
pect have to be considered). Modern theories are not beset by this dilemma, since the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
which includes the art of measurement or land-surveying). But all we find there is the 
distinction between a less precise branch that deals with practical matters, such as set-
ting up a camp, and a precise one, that is directed towards what always is.  
The ancient thinker who is perhaps most famously connected with the idea of 
a measure, Protagoras, claims that man is the measure of all things - a claim, which, 
according to the discussions we find of it in Plato’s Theaetetus and indeed in Aristo-
tle’s Metaphysics, is an epistemological claim. We will have to leave out any discus-
sions of ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical notions of a measure here. And 
within the context of natural philosophy, it is only Aristotle who discusses the theo-
retical problems the notion of measurement raises explicitly. Unfortunately, in this 
paper I will not be able to look at one area that is quite important for measurement 
theory in this context, astronomy, and also not at the relationship between measure-
ment theory and proportion theory. 
2
 Cf., for example, Aristotle, Physics Books III and IV. Translated with introduction 
and notes by Edward Hussey [Physics] (Oxford 1993); U. Coope, Time for Aristotle. 
Physics IV.10-14 [Time] (Oxford 2005); and T. Roark, Aristotle on Time, A Study of 
the Physics (Cambridge 2011). 
3 
restriction to simple measures that we find in Aristotle’s account was ultimately mod-
ified in the history of measurement theory.  
We will start with a brief sketch of the crucial features a measure exhibits ac-
cording to modern notions of measurement, as this will give us some conceptual tools 
for understanding Aristotle’s account of measurement. Subsequently, we will discuss 
the essential parts of the most extensive and important passage on measurement in 
Aristotle’s corpus, the most relevant bits of a passage from Metaphysics book Iota. 
With the reconstruction of Aristotle’s understanding of measurement in hand, I will 
then show the dilemma Aristotle’s notion leads into for measuring motion. For this 
part I will look at Aristotle’s Physics, book IV and VI, where we find a contrast be-
tween Aristotle’s implicit and his explicit understanding of the measure of motion: 
Aristotle implicitly uses a complex measure in several passages, taking into account 
the time taken as well as the distance covered, very prominently so when solving one 
of the problems Zeno’s dichotomy paradox raises, which allows him to offer a good 
resolution to Zeno’s paradox.  The problem is that Aristotle is not entitled to this re-
sponse given his official account of measure, since his explicit definition in the Meta-
physics characterizes the measure of motion as a simple measure. In accordance with 
this account, it is only time which is explicitly claimed to be the measure of motion in 
the Physics;
3
 as we will see, there is no other magnitude that is explicitly called a 
measure of motion and no combination of magnitudes that would make for a complex 
measure. While a complex measure is in tension with Aristotle’s official account of 
measurement, a simple measure will turn out to be insufficient for measuring motion 
and for resolving Zeno’s paradox. 
                                                          
3
 This is not to deny that Aristotle also talks about measuring time by motion (cf. 
Phys. Δ 12), but simply to point out that when we measure motion, only time is ex-
plicitly called a measure of motion.  
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2. Basic Features of Contemporary Notions of Measurement  
While Aristotle discusses measure in quite some detail, it is in fact not easy to give an 
account of his notion of measurement. In order to get a better grasp of Aristotle’s ac-
count, it will be helpful first to sketch some basic structures of a contemporary under-
standing of measurement, as we find it in the philosophical literature on measurement 
theory. This will help to make explicit certain features that Aristotle assumes implicit-
ly and it will show how certain features of the measurement procedure that may 
sound odd in Aristotle are in fact predecessors of features we also assume when giv-
ing an account of measurement. In this way a sketch of some of the basic features of a 
modern notion of measurement will allow us to navigate the difficult texts of Aristo-
tle on measurement more easily. And we have to introduce a modern conception of 
measurement anyway if we want to compare it to Aristotle’s account. 
I will sketch important features of a contemporary conception of measurement 
that is in accordance with the “Foundations of Measurement” by 
Krantz/Luce/Suppes/Tversky and Ellis’s “Basic Concepts of Measurement”.4 I will, 
however, leave out a lot of the technicalities that are not relevant for a comparison 
with Aristotle.  
It may seem that this is a hopelessly anachronistic approach and that introduc-
ing Krantz et al. is real overkill – not only are there important conceptual differences, 
but also enormous technical ones. And in fact both Ellis and Krantz et al. seem to 
have very different projects than Aristotle: Ellis’ aim is to give “a consistent positivist 
account of the nature of measurement”. And Krantz et al. want to build an axiom-
                                                          
4
 D. Krantz, R. Luce, P. Suppes, and A. Tversky, Foundations of Measurement 
[Foundations] (Dover 2006) (a first edition was published in 1971); B. Ellis, Basic 
Concepts of Measurement [Concepts] (Cambridge 1968). 
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system that allows them to establish representation and uniqueness theorems that hold 
for all kinds of different measures.
5
 I want to show, however, that while all three pro-
jects are based on very different motivations and prerequisites, nevertheless they all 
are concerned with what we may call foundations of measurement,
6
 they all want to 
provide conceptual clarifications of our understanding of measurement and, to some 
degree, clean up potential conceptual confusions.
7
 
  Thus, introducing Ellis and Krantz et al. is not to deny that modern approach-
es have a very different starting point than Aristotle,
8
 but an attempt to show that it 
can be fruitful to keep some of our modern notions consciously in mind for under-
standing Aristotle – not only in order to find interesting conceptual similarities, but 
also to get a better understanding of the differences. The sketch I give here will be in 
accordance with the account of Ellis and Krantz et al., but it will not simply be their 
account, as this is too abstract for our purposes. Instead I will extract three essential 
features of measurement that allow us to compare Aristotle with a modern account.  
                                                          
5
 See Krantz et al., Foundations, 12: “We conclude, then, that an analysis into the 
foundations of measurement involves, for any particular empirical structure, the for-
mulation of a set of axioms that is sufficient to establish two types of theorems: a rep-
resentation theorem, which asserts the existence of a homomorphism φ into a particu-
lar numerical relational structure, and a uniqueness theorem, which sets forth the 
permissible transformations φ → φ’ that also yields homomorphisms into the same 
numerical relational structure. A measurement procedure corresponds to the construc-
tion of a φ in the representation theorem.” Their basic idea is to construct a homo-
morphism into the real numbers. Cf. also Foundations, 13. 
6
 Krantz et al. point out on p. XVIII that they are concerned with foundations of mea-
surement and “not with historic or current practice of measurement in any field”. And 
they give a foundational theory of the practices and conceptions that can be under-
stood as part of the ancient or modern practice of measurement. 
7
 Ellis’ main thesis is that “certain metaphysical assumptions have played havoc with 
our understanding of many of the basic concepts of measurement, and concealed the 
existence of certain more or less arbitrary conventions” and thus he wants to examine 
what he considers to be the basic concepts of measurement. Krantz et al. take it that 
the practices and conceptions of measurement can be freed from conceptual messes 
by putting them into a formal theory and axiomatising them. And we will see Aristo-
tle in his account of measurement ready to point out potential conceptual confusions 
(cf., for example, 1053a27-30 and the discussion of this passage below). 
8
 For example, a different mathematics, a different account of quantities, etc. 
6 
Let us start now by asking what we normally take the task of a measure to be. 
Measuring somehow allows us to connect the physical world with numbers. But 
measuring does not mean to assign some numbers to the perceptible world in a ran-
dom fashion. Rather, a measure enables us to quantify physical things, processes, and 
states of affairs systematically and is thus one way to understand the perceptible 
world as something intelligible. In order to quantify something, we have to decide 
first which aspect of a thing we want to quantify – for example, do we want to meas-
ure its volume, its temperature, or its density. How much of this aspect a thing pos-
sesses, that is, the amount of this aspect, can then be measured by assigning it to 
numbers with the help of measurement units. So in order to measure something, three 
things have to be taken into account: 
(1) The respect in which something is meant to be measured has to be determined, 
that is, we have to decide whether we are going to measure the weight or rather the 
length of a table. This is what I want to call the dimension measured in the following, 
as is common in measurement literature.
9
 (In fact, the English word “dimension” de-
rives from Latin “dimetiri”, which means “to measure out”).10 Thus by dimension we 
should not just understand spatial dimensions, but all kinds of respect that we may 
want to measure.
11
 In modern literature on measurement dimension can include sim-
ple as well as complex dimensions, that is, dimensions that are derived from a combi-
nation of simple dimensions.
12
 By contrast, we will see below that ancient Greek 
                                                          
9Following Fourier’s introduction of the notion of physical dimensions; see, for ex-
ample, also Krantz et al. p. 455. 
10
 See the OED entry on “dimension”.  
11 Cf. also Ellis, who points out on that we speak of “the dimension of length, mass, 
time-interval and so forth” (Concepts, 139). 
12
 In the literature, we often find a distinction between fundamental (or primary) and 
derived (or secondary) measures, quantities or scales, whereby a “derived scale is one 
which in the procedure of measurement presupposes and uses the numerical results of 
at least one other scale”, while a fundamental scale does not depend on other scales (P. 
7 
treatment of measurement focuses on simple dimensions,
13
 the only complex dimen-
sions that seem to come into view are two- and three dimensional spatial magnitudes, 
planes and solids.
14
 Thus, the modern notion of dimension can include more than the 
ancient will, but the core notion stays the same, that we determine which aspect or 
property we want to measure.   
The thing to be measured with respect to this dimension (that is the thing qua 
possessing a certain feature) will be called the measurand. So if we decide to measure 
the weight of a table, the dimension to be measure is weight, and the measurand is the 
weight of the table. 
(2) The measurand must be quantified by assigning it to the number series in a sys-
tematic way. 
(3) Units have to be defined to carry out this quantification of a certain dimension. A 
certain amount of this dimension is taken as a unit, for example, a metre or a foot is 
take as a unit for length, so that the measurand, for example, the length of my table, 
can be determined as a multiple of it. 
Let me give a slightly fuller discussion of each of these three requirements 
(this more detailed account can be skipped by anybody who is satisfied with the little 
sketch above):  
(1) Given that we often understand the term “dimension” in a merely spatial sense, 
capturing length, breadth, and depth, it may seem unclear what it in fact means within 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Suppes’ article on “Theory of Measurement” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy 2003 [Measurement], cf. also Krantz et al., Foundations, chapter 10). A de-
rived or secondary scale need not be the combination of two or more fundamental 
scales, but could in principle also be derived from just one fundamental or primary 
one, while a complex scale is the product or ratio of at least two other ones. 
13
 And this paper should shed a bit of light for some of the reasons for this focus on 
simple dimensions. 
14
 Two- and three-dimensional spatial magnitudes are, however, not necessarily seen 
as combinations of simpler dimensions. 
8 
the context of measurement. And even in the literature on measurement, it is some-
times seen as an unclear notion; as Ellis claims: “It is difficult to say how dimensions 
are usually regarded. For no one seems to have any clear conception.”15  As suggested 
above, I will understand “dimension” here as the aspect under which something is 
regarded in the process of measuring, hence as the feature, property or quality
16
 that is 
quantified. This includes spatial dimensions, but is not restricted to them. Thus, for 
example, a golf club may be regarded from the point of view of its mass, its length, or 
the force it exerts on a golf ball – these are all different dimensions that we can meas-
ure. Which respect is taken into account depends on what we want to examine, and it 
has to be chosen before we can start measuring (there is no point in bringing my 
weights for measuring if it then turns out that we are actually going to measure 
length).  
Determining the respect in which something is going to be measured includes 
determining whether the dimension is simple (for example, in the case of measuring 
length) or complex (as for instance with speed, where we deal with two dimensions, 
time and space). If we are dealing with a complex dimension, we also have to deter-
mine the relation of the different dimensions (for example, for our modern notion of 
speed we divide the space covered by the time taken, v = s/t,
17
 it is displacement per 
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 Ellis, Concepts, 139. He understands by ‘dimension’ generalized unit names: “just 
as a unit name refers to a particular scale, so a dimension name refers to a particular 
class of scales” (142). 
16
 Note that the notion of quality we will come across later on in Aristotle’s account 
of measurement units is a different notion. 
17
 Usually, we talk about v = (ds/dt), that is, about instantaneous speed, which is not a 
concept the ancient Greeks worked with. However, while we can talk about move-
ment at a point nowadays, the way we get to this instantaneous speed is still to take a 
period and distance in which a movement takes place and make the period and dis-
tance shorter and shorter so as to let them converge to the limit of the initial period 
and distance. Our notion of an instantaneous speed, hence, depends also on extended 
periods and distances (even if the limit is distinct from any member of the series); cf. 
also Lear, “A note on Zeno's arrow”, Phronesis 26 (1981). 
9 
time, while in order to calculate electric charge we multiply amperes with seconds, c 
= A times s). Thus we determine the dimension to be measured in such a way that it 
can guide the process of measurement. If we are, for example, interested in the force 
your golf club exerts on a golf ball, our measure will be complex, reflecting that force 
is the product of mass and acceleration (F = m • a).18 After a certain aspect of the golf 
club is measured we are able to compare the result of this measurement to the result 
of a measurement with regard to the very same aspect of other bodies or of the same 
body at a different time. 
 It may sometimes seem trivial to determine the dimension to be measured and 
there are modern accounts of measurement which do not seem to refer to anything 
that corresponds to what I call ‘dimension’. This we find for instance in the Encyclo-
paedia Britannica
19
 where “measurement” is defined as the “process of associating 
numbers with physical quantities and phenomena”. In this account nothing like di-
mension is mentioned. What we call dimension is, however, introduced with the 
measurand: “Measurement begins with a definition of the measurand, the quantity 
that is to be measured” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, article “Measurement”, my italics).  
Here we obtain the dimension needed for measurement with the definition of the 
measurand.
20
 Determining the dimension is nevertheless unproblematic in many cases 
                                                          
18
 Not all dimensions will be measured directly, rather some will be measured through 
calculations and theories based on other measures; for example, our measurement of 
force will usually rely on our measurement of mass and acceleration, and in some 
cases we may measure momentum and then calculate the force. 
19
 In the article “Measurement”, 2004 edition (updated 2015). 
20
 Similarly, the first characterization of measurement given in Krantz et al., Founda-
tions does not seem to refer to something corresponding to what I called ‘dimension’, 
that is, the certain respect, which is chosen for comparison. However, the authors pre-
suppose what I call ‘dimensionality’ in that they understand “the measuring of some 
attributes of a class of objects or events” as the process of associating “numbers (or 
other familiar mathematical entities such as vectors) with the objects in such a way 
that the properties of the attributes are faithfully represented as numerical properties” 
(p.1). The measurands here are “some attributes of a class of objects or events”, and 
10 
in a modern context. Therefore, many modern conceptions of measurement can just 
presuppose dimensionality without discussing it. The fact that dimensionality may be 
difficult to deal with, however, will become obvious once we investigate the measure 
of motion in Aristotle. 
(2) In order to measure something, we have to assign its structure in a certain respect 
(the dimension we are measuring) to a mathematical structure, i.e. to the real num-
bers, the natural number series, or to a certain set of numbers.
21
 Hence Krantz et al. 
understand measurement as the “construction of homomorphisms […] from empirical 
relational structures of interest into numerical relational structures that are useful”.22 
This is a rather abstract way of conceptualising the human activity of measur-
ing that I perform, for example, when I measure the length of the walls of a room 
with a ruler, which allows me to assign numbers of feet or metres to the length of the 
walls that I can then compare (I can determine which wall is longer), multiply (I can 
determine the square metre or square feet of the room), etc.  
The assignment used for measurement purposes is a homomorphism, that is, a 
structure-preserving map;23 but it is not normally an isomorphism, that is, a homo-
                                                                                                                                                                     
the dimension is the kind of attribute measured. Moreover, the authors discuss dimen-
sion explicitly in chapter 10. 
21
 Krantz et al. take the co-domain to be real numbers, but Suppes, Measurement talks 
about “some set of numbers”, and in simple cases the natural numbers will suffice. 
The ancient Greeks had a different conception of number, and real numbers do not 
occur in it, but for the assignment it is enough to have some conception of numbers. 
22
 Cf. Krantz et al., Foundations, 9, my italics. By a relational structure they under-
stand “a set together with one or more relations on that set”, for example, a numerical 
relational structure is the set of real numbers, together with a “greater than” relation 
and an operation of addition, see p. 8.  
23
 To express ‘preserving structure’ in slightly more formal terms: we have a domain 
of physical objects, a concatenation function (∘) and a relation (‘bigger than’) on the 
one hand, and for the codomain the real numbers with addition (+) and a relation (>) 
on the other hand. Then a homomorphism is a function from the structure of what is 
to be measured into the real numbers, such that F(g1 ∘ g2) → F(g1) + F(g2), g1 ≳ g2 
→ F(g1) ≥ F(g2), etc. For Krantz et al. F is essentially not a surjection. I owe this 
clarification to an anonymous reader for OSAP. 
11 
morphism which is bijective (it is both one-to-one and onto).
24
 In modern science, 
this systematic homomorphic mapping transfers the empirical realm to an abelian 
group
25
 of real numbers. As Suppes writes: “What we can show is that the structure of 
a set of phenomena under certain empirical operations and relations is the same as the 
structure of some set of numbers under corresponding arithmetical operations and re-
lations”.26 We may thus use our knowledge of the arithmetical structure to infer in-
formation about the homomorphic empirical structure; for example, if we measure 
two tables and find that one is 80cm in length and the second is 90cm in length, then 
we may infer from the arithmetical realm that if we put them together (and thus “con-
catenate” them), together they should be 170 cm in length.27 
Finally, the rule of assignment has to guarantee that under the same conditions 
the same assignments will be made, and under different conditions different assign-
ments are possible.
28
  
 (3) What we measure in the physical world will usually be a continuum in the sense 
that it is not yet divided into given parts, for example, if you want to measure the 
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 For this see Krantz et al. who explicitly talk of a homomorphism in the definition 
given above, and who note on p. 8: “We speak of a homomorphism (rather than of an 
isomorphism) because Φ [i.e. the used numerical function] is not normally one-to-
one.” 
25
 That is, to a group where commutativity holds, so that the result of an operation 
does not depend on the order in which the elements of the group are written. 
26
 Cf. Suppes, Measurement. 
27
 We do this via the injection F: F(80 cm length ∘ 90 cm length) = F(80 cm length) + 
F(90 cm length) = 80.0 + 90.0 = 170.0 and F (170cm) = 170.0 (or the inverse: F-
1(170.0) = 170 cm). According to Suppes, this does not mean that all systems of 
measurement will work in a simple compositional way, but for our purposes we will 
leave non-additive scales to the side. 
28
 Ellis, Concepts, 41 characterizes these conditions as follows: “Measurement is the 
assignment of numerals to things according to a determinative, non-degenerate rule”, 
where “determinative” means that “provided sufficient care is exercised the same 
numerals (or range of numerals) would always be assigned to the same things under 
the same conditions”, and “non-degenerate” means that the rule “allows for the possi-
bility of assigning different numerals (or ranges of numerals) to different things, or to 
the same thing under different conditions”. Krantz/Luce/Suppes/Tversky call this a 
“uniqueness theorem”. 
12 
length of your table, you are normally dealing with a continuous length without any 
actual parts.
29
 Consequently, the structure of such continua cannot be assigned to a 
numerical structure straight away, since that would require given discrete chunks that 
we can assign to numbers. Instead, we need basic units to mark off discrete parts. 
These basic units have to be constant, otherwise we cannot make sensible compari-
sons.  
For some dimensions the units used can be defined once and then kept for fur-
ther measurement procedures. For example, in order to measure weight, we can de-
fine a stone as our unit and then use the very same stone for measuring weight over 
and over again, for different measurement procedures at different times; or, to use a 
different example, we can always use the same measuring cup (where the volume that 
fits into the cup is the unit of measurement) for different baking occasions. And this 
is similar in the case of measuring length, I can use the very same centimetre on a rul-
er to measure out different lengths. What is specific to time-measurement, which is 
crucial for measuring motion, is that here the measurement units always have to be 
“produced” anew – at each moment when we want to measure something we need a 
motion or change going on from which we can derive a unit (we cannot use a past 
second to measure a time right now). This process of creating units has to be regular 
(as, for instance, the regular vibration of a quartz in our watches) to secure the units 
being constant.
30
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 Whatever your metaphysics of continua is on the micro-level. 
30
 While the units used to measure and the process used to gain measurement units 
have to be regular, regularity (in the sense of having always the same quantitative size) 
of the thing inquired is not a necessary condition for countability or measurability, 
since also irregular pieces can be counted and measured. For example, if I drop my 
tea cup on the floor and it breaks, I can count the number of pieces that are now left 
of my cup, even if they are irregular pieces; and I can measure the duration of a mo-
tion even if it changes direction or speed. And counting or measuring something does 
not “produce” a regular order, either. 
13 
The units used for measurement have to be chosen in accordance with the 
measure: what is to be measured and the units chosen to measure have to be of the 
same dimension (we cannot measure the weight of a table with centimetres). And 
they also need the same degree of complexity. For example, as the measure of the 
force exerted by a golf club is complex – it is the product of mass and acceleration (F 
= m • a) – the units have to be complex as well, usually kg ∙ m/sec². In Aristotle we 
will see this requirement, with an important restriction, spelt out as a “homogeneity” 
requirement. 
The units used for measuring are in principle arbitrary in the sense that we can 
use units of different size – I can use centimetres as well as inches for measuring the 
length of my table, the one is no more natural than the other. Centimetres will divide 
the length of my table in different (potential) parts than inches, but both will allow me 
to make reliable comparisons equally.  
By understanding the arbitrary choice of a dimensional unit as an important 
feature of measurement, we are distinguishing measurement from mere counting 
where what is quantified is given as discrete elements. Counting can be understood as 
determining the cardinality of a plurality of given discrete things by coordinating two 
procedures: the operation that allows us to consider each element of the plurality sin-
gly, no matter in which order, is coordinated with the operation that takes us through 
the series of the natural numbers. This has to be done in such a way that whenever I 
take up a new element I move ahead one step in the number series; for example, when 
counting my chickens, I take up the first chicken and start with the first element in the 
number series, 1, then I take up the next chicken and move ahead one step in the 
number series, to 2, etc. In the procedure of counting we do not need to break down a 
continuum first into parts that can then be assigned to numbers, as we do when we 
14 
measure something; rather, with counting there are already given discrete parts. 
While with measuring we use arbitrary units and we first have to “divide” the contin-
uous quantity into parts, with counting the individual elements we count are given as 
is the unit with which we count (as, for example, the unit “chicken”), that cannot be 
made smaller or bigger arbitrarily, since then we are counting something else.
31
 And 
with mere counting, like counting up to a hundred, no dimension whatsoever plays a 
role,
32
 since we normally do not understand numbers to have any dimension of their 
own
33
 – thus they are suitable to be used for operations on all sorts of dimensions.34  
There are, however, authors like Suppes, Measurement, who treat counting as 
a measuring procedure, taking it as an absolute scale.  This seems to be supported by 
the fact that we talk about two groups being equal in number just as we talk about 
                                                          
31
 In case we are to count, that is, we quantify given discrete things, as, e.g., in Aristo-
tle’s example of quantifying horses in Physics 220b20-22?, the dimension is ex-
pressed by the very units – both are “horse”. When we measure and thus quantify 
continua, on the other hand, dimension and units are not the very same thing: for ex-
ample, our dimension measured may be time, in which case our units will be a certain 
amount of time, like seconds or minutes. 
32
 In Aristotle’s example of counting horses, however, dimension does play a role, 
since if we do not determine the dimension “horse” first, we may as well be counting 
chickens, see also Physics 223b13-14. If you want to count how many human beings 
are in a room, and we have not yet clarified the dimension “human beings” as what 
we count, the number we end up with may instead correspond to the number of ani-
mals in this room, see also below. In contrast to measuring, however, there is no arbi-
trary unit involved (I normally cannot use a slightly smaller unit than human being to 
quantify the number of human beings in the room in the way that I may use millime-
tres in some cases, rather than centimetres, or inches to measure length). 
33
 Understanding number as Russell does in his Principles of Mathematics (London 
1972), 116 as the class of similar classes: “Mathematically, a number is nothing but a 
class of similar classes”. 
34
 The difference we are interested in – between counting, where the parts we count 
are already given as elements of a group, and measuring, where such parts first have 
to be gained in some respect – we also find with Ellis, Concepts, 15 in the context of 
determining the rules of applying pure arithmetic: “[…] numeral terms are always 
interpreted as the number of things in a group or as the measure of something in some 
respect” (his italics). Consequently, Ellis is quite reluctant to call counting a measur-
ing procedure, pp. 152-159, thinking it lacks the arbitrariness as there is no choice of 
unit with counting. 
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them as being equal in other qualities.
35
 And indeed this makes good sense to the ex-
tent that one can compare two groups with respect to the number of their elements. 
(For reasons to do with his ontology, Aristotle will also belong in this group of au-
thors who, at least sometimes, understand counting as a form of measuring.) Howev-
er, for our purposes it will be useful to distinguish in principle between counting and 
measuring. 
 
3. The general concept of measure in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
Having sketched crucial features of a contemporary understanding of measurement, 
let us now look at Aristotle’s discussion of measurement. The Metaphysics is the text 
where Aristotle gives an explicit account of his concept of measurement, especially in 
book Δ, chapter 6 (1016b17-25), book Ι, chapter 1 (1052b18-1053a8) and book Ν, 
chapter 1 (1087b33-1088a14). I will restrict myself for the most part to the essentials 
of book I, chapter 1 since this is the most elaborate passage concerning measurement. 
The other two passages will sometimes be referred to; they are basically variations of 
the passage in Iota. 
The context in which Aristotle gives an account of measure in book Iota is his 
investigation of what it means to be one – a question that is explicitly distinguished 
from the question which things are one. To be one can mean different things,
36
 but, 
according to Aristotle 
τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι […] μάλιστα δὲ τὸ μέτρῳ εἶναι πρώτῳ ἑκάστου γένους 
καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐλήλυθεν. 
                                                          
35
 Cf. also Ellis, Concepts, 152. 
36
 Cf. also David Charles’s distinction between what “one” signifies and what one is 
in his Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, Oxford, 2000, pp. 24-54. 
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 to be one is […] especially to be the first measure of a kind, and most strictly 
of quantity; for it is from this that it has been extended to the other cases 
(1052b16-20). 
 
So in a primary sense being one means being a measure for quantities. A measure can 
be seen as a one in two respects, as we already saw in the previous section: it can be a 
one qua particular measurement unit (for example, one centimetre as the unit to 
measure length)
37
 and a one qua determining the one respect that we are measuring 
(for example, the one respect we are measuring with regard to my desk is length, not 
weight).
38
 
 The most important passage for reconstructing Aristotle’s explicit account of 
measurement is 1052b16-1053b8. This long passage can be seen to be structured as 
follows: (1) Aristotle starts out by claiming that being one means primarily to be the 
first measure of something (1052b16-20). (2) We then get a brief account of the func-
tion of a measure – in the strictest sense a measure is what allows us to know a quan-
tity (1052b20-31). Subsequently, we learn the requirements for a measure:
39
 (3) it is 
indivisible either in quality or quantity (1052b31-35); (4) it is most exact if nothing 
can be added or subtracted without it being noticed (1052b35-1053a14); (6) and it is 
homogenous with what is to be measured (1053a24-27). In between we are also told 
                                                          
37
 At least if we take a unit here to be a translation of μέτρον (things look differently 
if we take it to be a translation of μονάς – I will say more on the ancient notion of unit 
below). 
38
 A measure establishes a kind of unity by defining a uniform aspect to be measured 
and by determining numerically the amount of this aspect which the thing to be 
measured possesses. 
39
 Aristotle’s account here seems to be descriptive rather than normative, that is, he 
seems to given an account of how measures do work rather than of the way in which 
they should work. Thus, I do not take Aristotle to be revisionist or reformist here 
about geometry, etc. (though his conceptual clarification could turn out to be revision-
ist about people’s actual practise).   
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that (5) sometimes there can be several basic “ones”, that is, several measurement 
units for the same kind (1053a14-24).
40
 Aristotle then (7) briefly tells us how we 
should understand his conception of measurement if we look at numbers (and count-
ing (1053a27-30), before (8) he discusses in how far science and perception can be 
understood as measures (1053a31-1053b3). In this context he briefly takes up Protag-
oras’ homo mensura statement, only to dismiss it as not saying anything new or spe-
cial. Finally, he gives a brief summary (9) of some of the main points (1053b4-8).  
We can see from this passage in Iota that for Aristotle a measure is character-
ized by four basic features – the task or function of a measure and three requirements 
needed for a measure to fulfil this function. To use a somewhat different order that 
will be useful for purposes of presentation we can say that for Aristotle   
(1) Measure is that by which the quantity is known – this is its general task;  
(2) A Measure always has to be homogenous with the measurand;  
(3) It is simple either in quantity or quality; 
(4) It is most exact if nothing can be added or subtracted without it being noticed. 
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 οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἓν τὸ μέτρον ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε πλείω, οἷον αἱ διέσεις δύο, αἱ μὴ 
κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ αἱ φωναὶ πλείους αἷς μετροῦμεν, καὶ ἡ 
διάμετρος δυσὶ μετρεῖται καὶ ἡ πλευρά, καὶ τὰ μεγέθη πάντα (“But the measure is not 
always one in number – sometimes there are several; for example, the semi-tones (not 
to the ear, but as determined by the ratios) are two, and the articulate sounds by which 
we measure are more than one, and the diagonal of the square and its side are meas-
ured by two quantities, and all magnitudes reveal similar varieties of unit”, 1053a 14-
18). These multiple units are incommensurable – strictly so in the case of the diagonal 
and side, with respect to harmony in the case of the semitones (diesis). A. Barker, 
Greek Musical Writings, volume II [Musical Writings] (Cambridge 1989), 72-73, n. 
16 and 17 understands the first occurrence of diesis as a measure in the context of this 
passage (that is in 1053a12) as referring to the empirical harmonics, and the second 
one, the one just quoted, to ratio theory; for a different suggestion for how to under-
stand the two kinds of diesis here can be found below. 
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We will see that these points only partly overlap with the three characteristics intro-
duced from contemporary debates. Let us investigate these four points we found in 
Aristotle in turn:  
(1) According to Metaphysics Iota, chapter 1, the essential task of measurement is to 
allow us to know the quantity of something:   
μέτρον γάρ ἐστιν ᾧ τὸ ποσὸν γιγνώσκεται  
For measure is that by which the quantity is known (1052b20).  
Of a quantity we always want to know how much or many it is – that is what the 
Greek word that we normally translate as quantity, poson, actually means. And a 
measure obviously enables us to answer this question. This is a feature which fits 
with our contemporary accounts of measurement, even if we did not explicitly intro-
duce it as a separate characteristic in our discussion above. To fulfil this function a 
measure needs certain characteristics which are expressed by the following conditions 
of Aristotle’s concept of measurement. 
(2) With Aristotle a measure – and by this Aristotle here seems to understand a meas-
urement unit – always has to be homogenous (συγγενὲς) with the thing measured:  
ἀεὶ δὲ συγγενὲς τὸ μέτρον· μεγεθῶν μὲν γὰρ μέγεθος, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον 
μήκους μῆκος, πλάτους πλάτος, φωνῆς φωνή, βάρους βάρος, μονάδων μονάς ” 
But the measure is always homogenous (with the measurand),
41
 it is of magni-
tudes a magnitude, and in particular of length a length, of breadth a breadth, of 
sounds a sound, of weights a weight, of units a unit (1053a24-27). 
                                                          
41
 The Greek text literally only says that the measure has to be συγγενὲς, but not what 
it is συγγενὲς with. However, something like “what is to be measured” or “the meas-
urand” is the only reasonable addition, since the measure has to be of the same genos 
as the thing to be measured (otherwise no measurement is possible – we could not, 
for example, measure temperature with a kilogram). Accordingly, translations nor-
mally add something like this; for example, Bonitz translates “Immer ist das Maβ 
19 
 
According to this passage, the dimensionality has to be the same for the measure and 
the measurand – if we want to measure a length, for example, we need another 
(smaller) length to measure it, while for the measurement of weight we cannot use a 
length but rather need another weight. This homogeneity constraint corresponds to the 
requirement that the measurement unit has to be of the same dimension as the meas-
urand we saw with our general notion of measure above. 
However, if we look a bit closer at this and surrounding passages, a restriction 
can be found in this homogeneity requirement that distinguishes Aristotle’s account 
in a crucial way from a modern one: In Aristotle, the dimension to be measured turns 
out to be always conceived of as simple, that is, one-dimensional. A first indication 
for this is that in the passage just cited length is measured with one measure, and 
breadth with another one. By contrast, today we would trace back the measure of 
breadth to the measure of length plus what we may call its orientation in space or as 
given in position (θέσει), if we think of it as referring to a geometrical figure in the 
ancient context.
42
 Aristotle uses what we would think of as a complex measure 
(length plus its orientation or position) like a simple one (breaths as its own, simple 
                                                                                                                                                                     
dem Gemessenen gleichartig”, Ross “the measure is always homogenous with the 
thing measured”, Tricot “La mesure est toujours du même genre que l'objet mesuré”, 
and Viano “Sempre la misura appartiene allo stesso genere delle cose che debbono 
essere misurate”.  
42
 When I am talking about what we may call “orientation in space” here, I am not 
suggesting that Aristotle could in the very same way talk about space. And for this 
idea it is not necessary that we can stand on the earth and say “this direction is length 
and that is breath or width”, but only that once we determine one direction as length, 
the other side (in two-dimension) is breath or width (though for Aristotle there is an 
absolute orientation of the world, as he argues in De Caelo Book II, Chapter 2, be-
cause the world is a living being). Aristotle may in fact mean two different things by 
πλάτος here: either an area (as he does, for example, in Metaphysics Δ 13, 1020a10–
12), or a length at right angles to a given length, what we may call “breath”. But in 
both cases we would think of πλάτος as what we measure with the help of length plus 
something else (for the claim that for Aristotle we do not measure an area by a length 
see also below). 
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dimension, that is not derived from another dimension).
43
 For Aristotle there is in fact 
no measurement dimension that is further divisible conceptually, i.e., that can be 
traced back to other, simpler dimensions. Nowhere in his Metaphysics do we find the 
possibility of a measure as the relation of two different qualities. 
It is not just an inference from silence if I claim that for Aristotle the dimen-
sion to be measured is one-dimensional. Rather, this strict one-dimensionality is re-
quired, among other things, by his account of numbers, which seems to be driven by 
anti-Platonist concerns:
44
 very roughly speaking, for Aristotle numbers are the multi-
ple of a basic unit – for example, we do not have a two as such, but a two that is the 
multiple of the unit “cup”, two cups,45 or a two that is the multiple of the unit “sec-
ond”, two seconds, etc.46 Thus numbers are necessarily tied to the dimension of this 
basic unit.
47
 But if a number is always bound to a particular dimension, it is difficult 
to combine this number with a number of a different dimension or to assign one and 
                                                          
43
 This is not just a restriction we find in Aristotle, but in Greek treatments of measure 
more generally and goes back to early near-eastern mathematics, being based on the 
distinction of one side of a rectangle as length and the other as width. What is special 
about Aristotle, however, is that in principle he would have the conceptual tools to 
overcome the restriction, as we will see below. 
44
 Cf. Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s and Platonic conception of numbers in book M 
and N of his Metaphysics, his Physics 204a17-20, Hussey, Physics, 78 and 89, and J. 
Annas, “Aristotle, Number and Time”, Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1975) who on 
99-100 understands what I will call “the dimensionality of numbers” as an anti-
Platonist reaction. 
45
 This fits with the principle of homogeneity prevalent in the mathematics of Aristo-
tle’s time; thus it is not a problem only Aristotle’s account of numbers would face. 
But it is not to be found with Plato and the early Academy against whom Aristotle is 
arguing in Metaphysics M and N. For Aristotle’s distinction between numbers with 
which we count and numbers that we count in the Physics cf. my Motion, chapter 8.  
46
 This is part of Aristotle’s attempt to ensure that objects of mathematics do not exist 
separately from physical particulars; cf. also Mendell, “Aristotle and Mathematics”, 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [Aristotle] (2004). For Aristotle, as I under-
stand him, the mathematician works with numbers of indivisible units, a two of monas, 
i.e., two monades. So also the mathematician works with numbers of something, only 
this time it is not cups but monades.  
47
 Compare Aristotle’s account of the difference between counting ten horses and ten 
dogs at the end of book IV of his Physics, 224a3ff. 
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the same number to different dimensions (as we do it, for example, when we talk 
about 30km/h). In order to be able to take different dimensions into account in a sin-
gle measurement procedure, we need something independent of both dimensions, so 
that both dimensions can be assigned to it; this is what we do nowadays when we 
work with a dimensionless number series.
48
 
We may assume that Aristotle has to allow for complex dimensions when 
dealing with surfaces or bodies. However, the way we measure an area for Aristotle 
seems to be with the help of a smaller surface, and a cube is measured by a smaller 
cube.
49
 Length, surface, and body are thus each a simple dimension for Aristotle.
50
   
The strict one-dimensionality can also be seen in Aristotle’s account of the 
measure of motion just a few lines after the last quotation:  
καὶ δὴ καὶ κίνησιν [εἰδῶσι] τῇ ἁπλῇ κινήσει καὶ τῇ ταχίστῃ (ὀλίγιστον γὰρ 
αὕτη ἔχει χρόνον)· διὸ ἐν τῇ ἀστρολογίᾳ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἓν ἀρχὴ καὶ μέτρον (τὴν 
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 Contemporary measurement theory works with such a dimensionless number series 
whatever our metaphysics of numbers may be. 
49
 To put it very roughly, in Metaphysics 992a10 ff. and 1085a7 ff. Aristotle distin-
guishes bodies, surfaces, and lines as three different genera and 1092b30 ff. can be 
read as excluding the possibility that different genera could be measured by the same 
measure. See also 1016b17-31 and Aristotle’s criticism of the dimensional confusion 
he thinks Plato gets into with his assumption of basic triangles forming the elemental 
bodies in De Caelo. These passages suggest that Aristotle would reject calculating the 
volume of a cube as length times breadth times height as theoretically inadequate, 
even though he may allow it for practical purposes in calculations. Aristotle is unfor-
tunately not very explicit, and he seems to allow different things for the purposes of 
calculation and constructions (see, for example, De Anima 413a11-20 and Metaphys-
ics 996b18-22 for squaring a rectangle, that is, finding an equilateral rectangle  equal  
to  an  oblong  rectangle with the help of a mean proportional between two straight 
lines). But for Aristotle there does not seem to be an operation like length times 
length and he does not work with complex measurement units. By contrast, in the 
Theaetetus, 147eff. Plato seems to suggest that an area will be determined as a prod-
uct, one unit times one unit. And in Laws 820a ff., in the context of introducing the 
idea of the incommensurable, the Athenian stranger claims that usually it is assumed 
that we can measure a length and a breath against each other. 
50
 And while Aristotle seems to allow a comparison of length to surfaces in Topics 
158b 30ff., what he does in fact compare there are the ratios of the areas to the ratios 
of the sides. 
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κίνησιν γὰρ ὁμαλὴν ὑποτίθενται καὶ ταχίστην τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, πρὸς ἣν 
κρίνουσι τὰς ἄλλας) 
And indeed [they know] movement too by the simple movement and the fast-
est (for this takes least time). Thus also in astronomy, such a 'one' is the start-
ing-point and measure (for they assume the movement of the heavens to be 
uniform and the fastest, and judge the others by reference to it) (1053a8-12).
 
 
  
Here we are told that in order to measure a movement we take another, simple motion 
and that is one that needs least time
51
 – thus time is the only dimension taken into ac-
count for this measurement.
52
 Hence, the dimension to be measured cannot be further 
analysed as the relation of two simpler dimensions (like the relation of time and dis-
tance),
53
 but is treated as simple in itself. To this it may be objected that what we 
measure with is another motion, and so something that is in itself complex (covering 
some distance in a certain time). However, all that is taken into account of this motion 
with which we measure is the time it takes, as Aristotle states explicitly; and while we 
could use a motion also to measure a distance,
54
 we normally cannot use the very 
same motion to measure time and distance of another motion simultaneously. The 
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 By the motion that takes the least time Aristotle probably has in mind that part of 
the heavenly motion that produces the smallest temporal unit, namely a day (which 
does not take least time in the sense of coming to a halt then, as the motion of the 
heavens is eternal, but in the sense that it requires the least duration to get back to its 
starting point).  
52
 Aristotle understands motion and speed here in a way that the fastest is what takes 
least time (no matter what distance is traversed). Given this understanding, the quick-
est movement is indeed the smallest quantum available and thus the one most appro-
priate as a unit. If we thought that Aristotle here understands speed more or less in the 
way we do as being determined by how much distance is covered in a certain time, 
the quickest movement would actually be not the adequately small quantum available 
in the sense specified by Aristotle for we would not notice whether it is a little bit 
faster or slower. For a discussion of the problems this understanding of the fastest 
movement raises cf. my Motion, chapter 8. 
53
 Or the relation of time and angle, in case we deal with angular velocity. 
54
 As Aristotle does in his Physics, cf. below. 
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distance the sun covers during a day, for example, plays no role when I use the sun’s 
motion to measure the journey from Athens to Sparta as needing, say, three days.
55
 
Now we may understand the passage as tracing back one dimension (motion) to an-
other one (time); however, we are tracing back motion to a dimension that is simple 
in itself, solely time. We will see this prominently taken up in Aristotle’s Physics 
where time (and only time) is claimed to be “the measure of motion”.56 For the Meta-
physics we can conclude that Aristotle’s model of measurement for movement is a 
one-dimensional measure employing one-dimensional units.
57
  
 Aristotle rounds off his discussion of the homogeneity criterion with a con-
ceptual clarification, warning the listener or reader of a conceptual mess she may get 
into if she transfers this criterion to the case of numbers without sufficient adjust-
ment:  
οὕτω γὰρ δεῖ λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅτι ἀριθμῶν ἀριθμός· καίτοι ἔδει, εἰ 
ὁμοίως· ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀξιοῖ ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἰ μονάδων μονάδας ἀξιώσειε 
μέτρον ἀλλὰ μὴ μονάδα· ὁ δ’ ἀριθμὸς πλῆθος μονάδων. 
We must state the matter so, and not say that the measure of numbers is a 
number; we ought indeed to say this if we were to use the corresponding form 
of words, but the claim does not really correspond – it is as if one claimed that 
the measure of units is units and not a unit; number is a plurality of units” 
(1053a27-30).  
                                                          
55
 Otherwise we would get into troubles like how to measure a motion if the motion 
we measure with proceeds in another direction than the one that is measured, or if the 
motion used for measurement purposes is a different kind of kinesis, etc. 
56
 Note that Aristotle claims that we measure motion by time and time by motion (for 
example, in Physics 220b31-32) as well as that time is the measure of motion (Phys-
ics 220b32-221a1, cf. below). 
57
 The units have to be one-dimensional as well, for they have to be chosen in accord-
ance with the dimension. 
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This passage has to be understood against the background of the ancient Greek idea 
that numbers start with two: the one is not a number itself, because all it does is to 
specify the unit for what we quantify, and as long as there is just one thing, no count-
ing is going on.
58
 Accordingly, Aristotle claims that if we just follow the wording so 
far, which tells us that we use a length to quantify a bigger length, it seems we need a 
number to quantify a bigger number. However, if we really understand the sense of 
what we are thus claiming, we see that a number within the ancient Greek context is 
necessarily already more than one; so we would quantify a number by a “plurality of 
units”, rather than by one unit (singular) that we need in order to quantify something. 
(3) According to the third feature of Aristotle’s notion of measurement, a measure has 
to be in some sense indivisible: 
πανταχοῦ γὰρ τὸ μέτρον ἕν τι ζητοῦσι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἢ 
τῷ ποιῷ ἢ τῷ ποσῷ. 
for everywhere they seek the measure to be one and indivisible; and this is 
what is simple either in quality or quantity (1052b33-35). 
 
In order to understand this passage we should take into account that each measure 
necessarily requires dealing with quantity as well as with quality in some sense, since 
it is always a quality (what we called “dimension”) which is to be quantified by our 
measurement procedure. Therefore, it would be strange if Aristotle’s “indivisibility in 
quality” referred to dimension in general as discussed above. For dimension is in-
volved in every measurement process; hence, if Aristotle were to use the term “quali-
                                                          
58
 Not understanding one as a number was common in Ancient Greece, cf. Euclid, 
Elements, book VII, def. 1-2, and T. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford 
1921) for an overview of what was common in Aristotle’s time. For reasons why Pla-
to and Aristotle sometimes treat one as a number nevertheless, cf. my Motion, chapter 
8. 
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ty” in order to refer to dimension in the quotation above, we would expect him to talk 
about indivisibility in quantity and quality. This should already warn us that Aristotle 
may employ a special understanding of quality and quantity in the passage quoted 
(our understanding of quality and quantity deriving from Categories 6 and 8 may not 
apply).
59
  
But what then does Aristotle mean by claiming that the measure is simple “ei-
ther in quality or quantity”?60 It seems to me that this question can be answered only 
if we take the context of this quotation into account. Then we see that indivisibility in 
quality or quantity is introduced once the question of the appropriate “one” for meas-
uring is discussed (cf. 1052b25-35 and 1088a2-3) – what we today may understand as 
a discussion of the appropriate scale.
61
 Thus these different indivisibilities seem to 
indicate a further specification of the kinds of magnitude measured. Apparently, Aris-
totle wants to examine two different kinds of dimensions that need different kinds of 
units to measure them: Some magnitudes will need units simple in quality as a basis – 
he also calls them “indivisible in eidos” (1087b34-1088a3) or “indivisible for 
knowledge” (1052a32-33). Other magnitudes need units that are quantitatively sim-
ple, which Aristotle explains as indivisible with respect to perception (1088a2-3).
62
 In 
both cases the measurement units have to be treated as indivisible because they are 
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 For example, we will see that certain quantities, like ἀκοή and φωνή, are “indivisi-
ble in quality”. 
60
 L. Castelli, Problems and Paradigms of Unity, Aristotle’s Accounts of the One 
(Sankt Augustin 2010), 77 assumes that indivisibility in quality indicates a looser no-
tion of indivisibility, without, however, giving any reasons for this assumption. 
61
 We can follow Suppes, Measurement and understand a scale “as a class of meas-
urement procedures having the same transformation properties”. The modern distinc-
tion between ordinal, interval, and ratio scales will, however, not be useful here (for a 
discussion of different scale types in contemporary measurement theory cf. Suppes, 
Measurement).  
62
 For the connection of indivisibility in quality with indivisibility in eidos, and of in-
divisibility in quantity with indivisibility for aesthesis cf. also Ross, Metaphysics, 472. 
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serving as the basis in such a way that the measurand can be expressed as the multiple 
of this basis.  
Unfortunately, Aristotle does not explain this difference any further. But he 
gives a couple of examples for each of them. So let us look at some examples Aristo-
tle gives in order to make this distinction clearer. As an example for indivisibility in 
quantity we are given a foot:  
τὸ δ’ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν θετέον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἤδη· ἴσως γὰρ 
πᾶν συνεχὲς διαιρετόν. 
The one [the foot] must be placed among things which are undivided with re-
spect to perception, as has been said already – for every continuum is equally 
divisible (1053a23-24). 
Of course a foot is divisible in principle, since it is a continuum. However, for meas-
urement purposes we can treat it as being indivisible, since for our perception the foot 
is given as a whole in nature – originally our own foot – and hence as something we 
perceive as one thing. It is something that cannot be further divided in so far as it is a 
given whole (cf. 1052a22-23). So the foot is not indivisible as such, but indivisible in 
so far as it is treated as a unit for measurement purposes. 
We use such units that are indivisible with respect to perception in order to 
quantify continua. These units seem to be called “quantitatively indivisible” because 
in order to serve as a basis for measuring, these units have to be treated as undivided 
in their quantity for measurement purposes, for example, the foot is seen as undivided 
in its extension. 
Measurement units that are not indivisible in quantity but rather in quality, Ar-
istotle seems to illustrate, among other things, with the example of a human being, a 
letter in speech (φωνή), a foot in the sense of a metrical unit (βάσις) or a syllable in 
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rhythm (1087b35-36), and a semitone/quartertone (δίεσις) in music.63 I would suggest 
understanding these examples as follows: if we attempt to divide a letter like “ε”, ep-
silon, we will not get any properly articulate sound any longer and thus we are leav-
ing in some sense the realm of speech. Similarly, an attempt to divide a foot when we 
are scanning metres would lead us outside the business of scanning; to prevent leav-
ing the conceptual basis, we have to take the letter or the foot as an undivided unit. 
Similarly, if we take the semitone in the diatonic scale as our basic unit,
64
 we can of 
course divide the string on a monochord further, for example, between what we 
would call E and F, but this will not get us a tone that belongs to our musical scale 
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 Cf. 1052b33-1053a24 and 1087b34-88a11. It is semitones or quartertones depend-
ing on which scale is used. Cf. also LSJ for the understanding of βάσις in this very 
passage. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not specify which of the examples he takes to 
be units indivisible in quantity, and which ones indivisible in quality and his exam-
ples have been interpreted in different ways. Alexander (799, 21) claims a finger to be 
indivisible in eidos, because it is not divided into fingers, but into ‘half-fingers’ (in 
the context of measurement, a ‘finger’ (δακτυλιαῖον) for the Greeks refers to the 
length of a finger, sixteen of which make a foot). By contrast, Alexander understands 
the diesis, the semi-tone, as indivisible with respect to perception, because it is the 
smallest perceptible interval (cf. also 368.26). Against this understanding Ross, p. 
472 points out that from other passages in the Metaphysics we know that ‘indivisible 
in eidos’ applies to infimae species (999a3) and to genera and species (1016a19), 
which have a conceptual unity. While I think Ross is right to understand genera and 
species as indivisible in eidos, because of their conceptual unity, Ross also mentions 
“that which cannot be divided into parts different in kind from the whole” (1014a27), 
i.e. elements. However, in 1014a27ff. Aristotle does not claim that elements are “in-
divisible in eidos”, but only that they are not divisible into what is different in eidos, 
that is, “even if we divide them, they will be divided into homogenous parts 
(1014a30). In any case, I think it is clear that the examples of the letter, the semitone, 
of human beings, and horses do not fit what Aristotle has said about units indivisible 
in quantity in 1053a, namely that they are continua that are in principle further divisi-
ble; and also Alexander 369,1 and Ross p. 472 understand man and horse as indivisi-
ble in eidos. 
64 The example of the diesis is complicated by at least three factors: (a) the diesis 
could either refer to empirical harmonics or to mathematical ratio theory; (b) ancient 
musical theory recognized different harmonies with different diesis (see Barker, Mu-
sical Writings, volume I, 215-216); I have chosen one of them here, the diatonic one, 
to make the point clear; and (c) musical intervals are not additive measures in the way 
other measures are, since they are conceived within a system of intervals, which are 
akin to ratios. But even if this example in the way I spell it out here may make too 
many assumptions not shared by the reader, I think there are enough other examples 
in Aristotle that show what he understands by indivisibility in quality. 
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any longer. Rather, we will interpret such a tone as a badly played E or F.
65
 Attempt-
ing to divide such a unit indivisible in quality would lead to something that is no 
longer a part of the respective field (of our musical scale, of scanning, or of speech). 
By contrast, units indivisible in quantity could in principle be divided and still be 
used as a unit for measuring the same magnitude, for example, in principle we could 
use a half foot (understood as a unit for length) as our basic unit to measure the length 
of our table.
66
 
With respect to the example of human beings, I take Aristotle's idea to be the 
following: let us say we take rational animal as the basis to capture human beings and 
we want to find out how many human beings there are in a given group. If we now 
“divide” this basis, for example by leaving out the feature “rational”, we cannot be 
sure any longer to capture only human beings with our account, and not owls or ea-
gles as well. Thus the concept must not be divided further in order to provide a basic 
unit that can be used to determine the number of a group. Accordingly, the units used 
to figure out how many human beings are in a group are units indivisible in eidos or 
to knowledge, because if one tries to divide such a unit further, it will not fit its defi-
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 In ancient musical theory an octave consists of two tetrachords (each spanning a 
perfect fourth, in a diatonic scale these are divided into two tones and a diesis) and a 
tone in between the two tetrachords. A diesis, although it can be called a semitone, is 
a little bit less than a half tone in our modern diatonic scale (and a tone minus this 
diesis could also be called a diesis, but would be slightly more than a half tone – this 
would be one explanation why Aristotle refers to two half tones in 1053a 14-18). A 
diesis is the smallest division in the scale; it measures the octave (or more exactly 
speaking, the two kinds of diesis together measure the octave) and can as such not be 
divided. Mathematically we can divide the half tone further of course, but then we do 
not have a unit for our octave of sounds any longer, rather we would move from 
measuring the octave musically to measuring mathematical intervals. 
66
 And this is in some sense what the Greek system of subunits does. But this system 
only makes sense in cases where dividing our one will still give us something of the 
same kind that we can use as a smaller unit, as when we divide our centimetre and 
then use a millimetre as out new unit; it does not work in cases where dividing the 
basic unit will lead us outside the realm of what we want to measure, as when we di-
vide a φωνή, a βάσις or a δίεσις.    
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nition any longer. Units that are indivisible in quality or eidos or knowledge are con-
ceptually indivisible. Unlike those units indivisible with respect to perception, these 
units indivisible in quality are not continuously extended (and thus further divisible in 
principle); rather, they are given as something discrete. 
 The important difference between the two magnitudes pointed out by Aristo-
tle is that with magnitudes measured by units indivisible in quantity we are quantify-
ing something continuous, while with magnitudes measured by units that are qualita-
tively, i.e., conceptually indivisible, we are quantifying something that is not continu-
ous.
67
 Many modern measurement theories are not really concerned with what Aristo-
tle calls “indivisible in quality”, since what is “indivisible in quality” is connected 
with counting, rather than with measuring. And indeed also Aristotle does not always 
count it as part of the field of measurable quantities. For the difference between the 
two scales corresponds to the difference between counting and measuring given by 
Aristotle in Δ 13, 1020a8-11:  
πλῆθος μὲν οὖν ποσόν τι ἐὰν ἀριθμητὸν ᾖ, μέγεθος δὲ ἂν μετρητὸν 
ᾖ. λέγεται δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ διαιρετὸν δυνάμει εἰς μὴ συνεχῆ, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ 
εἰς συνεχῆ· 
A quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. 
‘Plurality’ means that which is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, 
‘magnitude’ that which is divisible into continuous parts. 
This passage shows that Aristotle understands measuring in a strict sense as quantify-
ing a continuous magnitude. Quite often, however, we find a wider notion of meas-
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 We see here why the understanding of quantity and quality in these passages with 
the help of the Categories may be confusing. Thus it is probably better to think of the 
division between indivisibility in quantity and quality simply in terms of indivisibility 
with respect to perception and indivisibility in eidos, which we today understand as 
referring to the difference between continuous and discrete magnitudes. 
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urement in Aristotle which comprises what we would call measuring and counting; 
for example, when he calls measuring what we would call the counting of horses in 
1088a8-11. And we should not be too surprised by Aristotle’s employment of meas-
uring here, since this usage of the term ‘measuring’ can also be found in Euclid, for 
example in Elements book 7, definition 13 and 14;
68
 and it is helped by the fact that 
the Greek word ‘μετρέω’ can mean counting as well as measuring. 
(4) Since units indivisible with respect to perception are divisible in principle, we 
may wonder how we can find an appropriate unit as a basis at all. This question leads 
to the fourth feature of measurement in Aristotle, that a measure is most precise if 
nothing can be added or taken away without it being noticed: 
ὅπου μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι ἀφελεῖν ἢ προσθεῖναι, τοῦτο ἀκριβὲς τὸ μέτρον 
(διὸ τὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀκριβέστατον· τὴν γὰρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντῃ 
ἀδιαίρετον)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μιμοῦνται τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἀπὸ γὰρ σταδίου καὶ 
ταλάντου καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ μείζονος λάθοι ἂν καὶ προστεθέν τι καὶ ἀφαιρεθὲν 
μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος· ὥστε ἀφ’ οὗ πρώτου κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν μὴ 
ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτο πάντες ποιοῦνται μέτρον καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν καὶ βάρους 
καὶ μεγέθους· 
Where it seems to be impossible to subtract or add something, there the meas-
ure is exact (therefore the measure of number is most exact, for one takes the 
unit (monas) to be indivisible in every respect);
69
 but in the other cases we im-
itate this sort of measure. For in the case of a furlong or a talent or of anything 
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 13. Σύνθετος ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμῷ τινι μετρούμενος, “A ‘composite number’ is 
that which is measured by some number” (my italics).  
14. Σύνθετοι δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμῷ τινι μετρούμενοι κοινῷ 
μέτρῳ, “Numbers ‘relatively composite’ are those which are measured by some num-
ber as a common measure” (my italics). 
69
 Elders, One, 75 thinks that this passage shows the close connection of “the art of 
measuring with the theory of ideas” – without, however, giving any reasons for this 
assumption and without clarifying the passage in any way. 
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comparatively large, any addition or subtraction might more easily escape our 
notice than in the case of something smaller; so that the first thing from which, 
as far as our perception goes, nothing can be subtracted, all men make the 
measure, whether of liquids or of solids, whether of weight or of size 
(1052b35-1053a7, Ross’ translation with alterations).  
 
If a unit is of the right size relative to what is to be measured in that nothing can be 
added or subtracted without it being detected by perception, then that unit is accurate. 
The difference in precision discussed here is not the same as the difference between 
indivisibility in quantity and quality; Aristotle contrasts continuous and mathematical 
units (monas) when distinguishing different grades of precision (1053a21ff.), while 
he distinguishes between continuous and discrete physical entities when talking about 
the difference between indivisibility in quality and quantity, as we saw above. 
Aristotle’s talk about more or less exactness of the measure also suggests that 
to some degree he recognizes the problem of error, that is, that there can be variability 
or uncertainty in measurement.
70
 However, the problem of error is dealt with in terms 
of more and less accuracy, not in probabilistic terms, as we do in modern science, and 
it is not built into the calculation by ancient mathematicians.
71
  
 
4. Aristotle’s notion of measure as a predecessor of our modern conception 
We saw that Aristotle is not thinking of measurement in terms of axiomatization, rep-
resentation and uniqueness theorems. And we may even think that Metaphysics Iota,1 
                                                          
70
 Cf., for example, Suppes, Measurement, Section VII “Variability, Thresholds and 
Errors”. 
71
 In Hellenistic times, we get upper and lower bounds, e.g., with Aristarchus’ ac-
count of measurement of distances, which may seem like a predecessor to our idea of 
a tolerance interval or a margin of error. I owe the point about the problem of error to 
an anonymous reader for OSAP. 
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simply gives a general list of measurands and makes some general observations about 
them. However, it seems to me that this would seriously underestimate this chapter, 
which does not just provide some remarks about measurement, but rather clarifies the 
central task of a measure and details its essential features, as we saw in the last sec-
tion. If we now compare Aristotle’s understanding of measurement with the basic 
structure of measurement presented above, we will see that Aristotle’s account is a 
special case of the latter: Aristotle’s account possesses all the basic features we find 
in a modern context – thus there is enough communality that it can be seen at least in 
part as a predecessor of modern conceptions of measurement – but these features are 
determined in Aristotle’s Metaphysics in a very specific way.72 
All three features of measurement we postulated as necessary for measure-
ment – dimensionality, the assignment of the measurand to numbers, and measu-
rement units – can be found in the passages of Aristotle’s Metaphysics referred to 
above. As for dimensionality and measurement units, things seem to get complicated 
by the fact that the same term, “metron”, can be used in Greek for both. That Aristotle 
is nevertheless aware of the dimensionality of a measure, and distinguishes it clearly 
from the units used for measuring can be seen from passages like 1052b25-31: 
[…] τὸ μέτρον ἑκάστου ἕν, ἐν μήκει, ἐν πλάτει, ἐν βάθει, ἐν βάρει, ἐν τάχει 
(τὸ γὰρ βάρος καὶ τάχος κοινὸν ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· διττὸν γὰρ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, 
οἷον βάρος τό τε ὁποσηνοῦν ἔχον ῥοπὴν καὶ τὸ ἔχον ὑπεροχὴν ῥοπῆς, καὶ 
τάχος τό τε ὁποσηνοῦν κίνησιν ἔχον καὶ τὸ ὑπεροχὴν κινήσεως· ἔστι γάρ τι 
τάχος καὶ τοῦ βραδέος καὶ βάρος τοῦ κουφοτέρου). 
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 Aristotle does not seem to deal with actual representation theorems. However, he 
deals with measurement in a way that we could formulate as homomorphisms of 
physical structures into mathematical structures (though under certain provisos as we 
will see below), even if this presupposes a rather different perspective and uses for-
mal treatment foreign to ancient Greek thought. 
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[…] the measure of each is a one – in length, in breadth, in depth, in weight, in 
speed (for 'weight' and 'speed' are common to both contraries; for each of them 
has two meanings – 'weight' means both that which has any amount of heavi-
ness and that which has an excess of heaviness, and 'speed' both that which 
has any amount of movement and that which has an excess of movement; for 
even the slow has a certain speed and the (comparatively) light a certain 
weight). 
 
In this passage Aristotle expressly differentiates two meanings of terms like “weight” 
and “speed”: they signify on the one hand what we would call the dimension of cer-
tain magnitudes (weight and speed as dimensions are also attributed to light and slow 
things, and thus to “both contraries”, the light and the heavy, the slow and the fast) 
and on the other hand the different amount or grades of these magnitudes. The latter 
tells us the times a unit is contained in a measurand (heavy and speedy is called what 
has a considerable degree of weight and speed, that is, what contains the basic unit 
multiple times).
73
 
Aristotle’s awareness of the need to determine the dimension to be measured 
is also evident in his claim that the measure has to be of the same kind as the thing 
measured. And Aristotle presents a couple of different measurement units throughout 
his measurement discussion, a foot or a semitone, for example,
74
 and thus shows that 
he takes into account that different basic units of measurement have to be found for 
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 βάρος and τάχος are genuinely ambiguous in Greek (τάχος can mean swiftness as 
well as speed, βάρος heaviness as well as weight) in a way that is difficult to mirror 
exactly in English. 
74
 Cf. 1053a22 and 1053a12. 
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measurands of different dimensions – the semitone quantifies the dimension of pitch; 
the foot quantifies the dimension of length.
75
 
I should, however add, that the ancient understanding of measurement units is 
slightly different than our modern one: we saw that for Aristotle a unit has to be un-
derstood as indivisible (in some sense) so that the measurand can be seen as a multi-
ple of this basic one. By contrast, there is no expectation of indivisibility in modern 
theories of measurement. Furthermore, the ancient Greeks have two words for units: 
μονάς and μέτρον: monas is primarily tied to numbers – it is a unit of numbers in the 
sense that, for example, the number 5 consists of 5 monades.
76
 By contrast, metron 
can be a unit of all kinds of things, a centimetre, a kilogram, etc.  
As for the last of the three features we postulated as necessary for measure-
ment from a contemporary background, the assignment of the measurand to numbers, 
Aristotle’s remark that number means a measured plurality (1088a5) shows that the 
measurand is indeed assigned to numbers. This assignment makes it possible for the 
question, “How much (many) of the measurand in question are we dealing with?” to 
be answered.
77
 
However, it is with this feature that we also see clearly a peculiarity of Aristo-
tle that we do not find in modern accounts: assigning the measurand to numbers is not 
                                                          
75
 The fact that Aristotle discusses different basic units of length just shows that due 
to problems in dealing with incommensurables, etc., he has to assume different basic 
units for the treatment of length, one for the side of the square, another one for the 
diagonal of the square. 
76
 In this sense of unit, counting obviously involves units, cf. Euclid book VII, defini-
tion 2: “A number is a multitude composed of units (monades).” Monas is also de-
fined as a point without location. 
77
 Aristotle’s solution to deal with the application problem for mathematics lies in un-
derstanding perceptible objects qua mathematical objects, cf. Mendell, Aristotle. 
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an operation separate from determining the dimension and the measurement unit.
78
 
For Aristotle understands numbers as necessarily always dimensional, that is, a two is 
always the two of two cups, or two turtles, etc. Numbers just are the multiple of a 
basic one that has a certain dimension, for example, if I count the cups in my kitchen, 
“cup” is the one of which the number I end up with in my counting process is a mul-
tiple.
79
 Within the realm of natural philosophy, the dimension of the unit will always 
be a perceptible one and numbers are the quantification of a plurality of physical ob-
jects. By contrast, the mathematician deals with the “dimension” “monas” so to say, 
she also deals with numbers of something, only the something in this case is a math-
ematical monas, not physical aspects or things, two monades; but this is not what the 
natural philosopher interested in measurement of the physical world does.
80
 Given 
this account of numbers as the multiple of a basic perceptible one, things in the per-
ceptible world, which we count or measure, and numbers can be understood to be di-
rectly connected, that is, they are not members of different realms, as they may be 
seen on a Platonic picture where numbers belong to the intelligible realm, while phys-
ical things belong to the clearly distinguished sensible realm.  While on a Platonic 
picture the question thus arises how to connect the perceptible things with the intelli-
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 If we understand Aristotle’s theory of measurement as providing a homomorphism 
to his theory of number, then another peculiarity is that the homomorphism is an iso-
morphism (concatentation just is addition). 
79
 Cf. J. Annas, “Die Gegenstände der Mathematik bei Aristoteles“, in A. Graeser, 
Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle (Bern/Stuttgart 1987), 142-143, where she 
interprets Metaphysics M 1-3 as showing that mathematical objects are not ousiai, but 
merely onta, for ousiai exist separately on their own, and also J. Cleary, Aristotle and 
Mathematics. Aporetic Method in Cosmology and Metaphysics (Leiden 1995), 372. 
For the thought that mathematical objects and hence numbers must have some sort of 
matter with Aristotle cf. Hussey, Physics, 183, and Cleary, p.375. Understanding 
numbers as natural numbers and hence as a logical series like, e.g., Peano did, is not 
possible within Aristotle’s conceptual framework. Cf. also Henry Mendell, “Plato by 
the Numbers”, in Logos and Language, ed. D. Follesdal and J. Woods [Plato] (Lon-
don 2009), 137.  
80
 The mathematicians may also abstract a two from the “two cups”, but again this is 
not how for Aristotle the natural philosopher should think of numbers. 
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gible numbers, with Aristotle, by contrast, we do not need an additional operation of 
assigning the measurand to numbers. 
This understanding of numbers also makes dealing with what we call fractions 
more difficult than it is anyway in Greek mathematics. While Greeks tended to avoid 
fractions, they would have to deal with things like 3/5 of the land of Sparta for pur-
poses of land surveying, etc. But Aristotle’s account cannot really handle these frac-
tions: if your basic unit is a cup, then 5/16 does not seem to be a proper number. 
There were ways to deal with this problem – for example, an adequate subunit can be 
used as the new unit.
81
 But an adequate subunit may not always be available. In the 
context of baking, the subunit of the cup may be the tablespoon, but in other contexts 
there may be no suitable subunit for the cup. If fractions are not possible, then the 
comparison of some different lengths, say, with the help of a single basic unit, will 
also not be possible, as this method might lead to fractions. Rather we will need dif-
ferent “ones” to measure such different lengths.82 
 
5. The measure of motion in Aristotle’s Physics 
Let us now turn to Aristotle’s account of the measure of motion in his Physics. His 
account there will be sketched against the background of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion 
for two reasons: first, Zeno’s paradoxes challenged the intelligibility of motion fun-
damentally and one main way to prove the intelligibility of motion against Zeno is to 
show that a motion can be measured – if motion can be quantified it can be related to 
numbers and thus grasped as something intelligible.
83
 So it is only fitting that Aristo-
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 Cf. Mendell, Plato.  
82
 Our modern treatment of numbers and quantities does not face these problems. 
83
 Cf. 1053a7-8: καὶ τότ’ οἴονται εἰδέναι τὸ ποσόν, ὅταν εἰδῶσι διὰ τούτου τοῦ 
μέτρου (“they think they know the quantity when they know it by means of this [a 
most accurate] measure”, my italics). 
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tle employs a measure of motion as one way to counter Zeno’s paradoxes, as we will 
see below. Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, Aristotle’s treatment of 
Zeno is one of the most prominent places (though by no means the only one) where 
Aristotle clearly uses a complex measure – and he needs to use a complex measure in 
order to solve one aspect of the paradoxes. The discussion of Zeno thus also makes 
obvious that Aristotle really has to lose something if he sticks with the measurement 
account from Metaphysics Iota and what he gains with a complex measure of motion. 
Of a motion we can either measure the time it takes, its duration, or the dis-
tance it covers. Or we measure its speed, that is, how much distance it covers in a cer-
tain time. The latter gives us not only a measure of duration or distance, but a real 
measure of motion in its complexity, its relation of time and space.
84
 Thus measuring 
the speed of a motion allows us to determine the quantity of motion in its full sense 
(not just either its temporal or its spatial aspect). And it is this measure of motion that 
we will investigate in Aristotle in the following.  
 
5.1. Aristotle’s usage of the measure of motion 
How then does Aristotle conceptualise the measure of motion in his Physics? We will 
see that in order to answer this question, a distinction has to be made between Aristo-
tle’s explicit concept of the measure of motion and the measure of motion he implicit-
ly uses when fighting Zeno’s paradoxes, especially the dichotomy and the Achilles 
paradox. Let me give a brief sketch of Zeno’s paradoxes so that we can see how Aris-
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 I will talk about the relation of time and space, but some scholars may want to 
think of it as the relation between time and spatial distance. I argue in “Space in An-
cient Times: From the Presocratics to Aristotle”, in: “Space”, Oxford Philosophical 
Concepts, ed. Andrew Janiak (Oxford, 2017) that contrary to common opinion in the 
literature, Aristotle does develop a notion of space, and not just of place, in Physics 
IV, 1-5. But for our purposes here it is enough if the reader who objects to talking 
about space in an Aristotelian context reads “distance” instead. 
38 
totle’s understanding of measurement can react to Zeno. Since for Aristotle the Achil-
les paradox is basically a variation of the dichotomy paradox,
85
 I will restrict myself 
to this first paradox for the sake of simplicity.
86
  
 
5.1.1 Zeno’s Dichotomy Paradox 
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox claims that if a runner wants to cover a certain finite dis-
tance ΓΔ in a finite time ZH, he first has to cover half of this distance. For the contin-
uation of this paradox, there are two versions, sometimes called “progressive” and 
“regressive”: In the progressive form, the problem arises that the runner again has to 
cover first half of the remaining distance and then again the first half of the still re-
maining distance etc. Thus it seems that he will have to pass an infinite number of 
spatial pieces before reaching the end which does not seem to be possible in a finite 
time. The regressive version seems to intensify this paradox as it shows that the run-
ner must have already gone through an infinite number of spatial pieces to cover even 
the first half of the distance:
 87
  
 
Γ   Ξ   M         K                 Δ distance  
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Z                                       H time  
––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 As he claims in 239b14-26. 
86
 For Aristotle’s account of the paradox see Physics 239b9-14, 233a21-26, and 
263a4-11. Different reconstructions of this paradox have been given. I defend mine in 
Motion, chapter 3. 
87
 In the following diagram, “1”, “2”, etc. indicates the first, the second, etc. division 
of the distance. To make comparison easier with a passage from Physics VI 2 that is 
discussed in section 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, I have used Greek letters here following the let-
tering Aristotle uses in that passage. 
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So before the runner can cover the distance ΓΔ in a finite time ZH, she must have 
covered already half of this distance, ΓK, and before that half of this half, ΓM, etc., 
ad infinitum, which seems to imply that she cannot even get started.  
No matter which form of the paradox we choose, the progressive or the re-
gressive one, this paradox raises two logical problems: (1) By covering a finite dis-
tance a runner has to get over an infinite number of spatial pieces which, it seems, 
cannot be done. (2) This infinite number of spatial pieces shall be covered in a finite 
time, which seems to be impossible. The first problem I want to call the continuum 
problem since it arises as a problem for all magnitudes which we would call “contin-
ua”. The second one is the problem specific for motion and can thus be called the 
problem of motion. It is this second problem to which we will get an answer from the 
passage in Aristotle’s Physics I will investigate in a minute. 
The paradox of motion arises due to the fact that the infinitely many parts, 
which something moving seems to be forced to cover, have to be traversed in a finite 
time. No matter how the infinity of the parts is understood, the paradox of “not-
moving”, as Aristotle calls it in 239b11-12, is that an infinite distance has to be cov-
ered in a finite time. Thus the time available always seems to be too short to cover 
something infinite, whilst in an infinite time it may be possible to traverse something 
infinite. This difference in the characterisation of time and distance as presented in 
the paradox seems to prevent that they can be combined in order to give an account of 
motion. 
 
5.1.2 The measure of motion used by Aristotle 
The first time Aristotle reacts to this paradox is in Physics book VI, a book where he 
aims to show that motion, time, and space are continua, and what that means in his 
40 
theoretical framework.
88
 So let us have a look at the sixth book of Aristotle’s Physics. 
In the first chapter Aristotle tries to establish that a continuum cannot be thought of as 
being made up of extensionless points which are per se not divisible. Rather, parts of 
continua have to be extended. Now, while being extended, these parts could still be 
indivisible. The second chapter of book VI is then meant to demonstrate that the con-
tinua time and space are as divisible as one likes, and thus not atomistic, with the help 
of a comparison between two motions of different speed. According to Aristotle, it is 
this very proof in chapter two comparing two different motions demonstrating time 
and space to be divisible as much as one likes that can be used to show Zeno to be 
wrong. Let us look at the most important parts of this second chapter (232a24-
233a34):  
 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος εἰς μεγέθη διαιρετόν […], ἀνάγκη τὸ θᾶττον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ 
χρόνῳ μεῖζον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι ἴσον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι πλεῖον κινεῖθαι, 
καθάπερ ὁρίζονταί τινες τὸ θᾶττον. […] 
λέγω δὲ συνεχὲς τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς αἰεὶ διαιρετά· τούτου γὰρ 
ὑποκειμένου τοῦ συνεχοῦς, ἀνάγκη συνεχῆ εἶναι τὸν χρόνον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ 
δέδεικται ὅτι τὸ θᾶττον ἐν ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ δίεισιν τὸ ἴσον, ἔστω τὸ μὲν ἐφ’ ᾧ 
Α θᾶττον, τὸ δ’ ἐφ’ ᾧ Β βραδύτερον, καὶ κεκινήσθω τὸ βραδύτερον τὸ ἐφ’ ᾧ 
ΓΔ μέγεθος ἐν τῷ ΖΗ χρόνῳ.89 δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θᾶττον ἐν ἐλάττονι τούτου 
κινήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος· καὶ κεκινήσθω ἐν τῷ ΖΘ. πάλιν δ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ θᾶττον 
ἐν τῷ ΖΘ διελήλυθεν τὴν ὅλην τὴν ΓΔ, τὸ βραδύτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ τὴν 
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 Before Aristotle the term we translate as ‘continuum’, the Greek ‘syneches’, was 
prominently used by Parmenides but with quite different implications, cf. my ‘Par-
menides on “being suneches”’, Philosophical Inquiry, Festschrift for Alexander 
Mourelatos (forthcoming 2016).  
89
 The following lines may be easier to grasp with the help of the diagram provided 
below. 
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ἐλάττω δίεισιν· ἔστω οὖν ἐφ’ ἧς ΓΚ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ βραδύτερον τὸ Β ἐν τῷ ΖΘ 
χρόνῳ τὴν ΓΚ διελήλυθεν, τὸ θᾶττον ἐν ἐλάττονι δίεισιν, ὥστε πάλιν 
διαιρεθήσεται ὁ ΖΘ χρόνος. τούτου δὲ διαιρουμένου καὶ τὸ ΓΚ μέγεθος 
διαιρεθήσεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. εἰ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος, καὶ ὁ χρόνος. […] 
διαιρήσει γὰρ τὸ μὲν θᾶττον τὸν χρόνον, τὸ δὲ βραδύτερον τὸ μῆκος. εἰ οὖν 
αἰεὶ μὲν ἀντιστρέφειν ἀληθές, ἀντιστρεφομένου δὲ αἰεὶ γίγνεται διαίρεσις, 
φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶς χρόνος ἔσται συνεχής. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἅπαν 
ἐστὶ συνεχές· τὰς αὐτὰς γὰρ καὶ τὰς ἴσας διαιρέσεις ὁ χρόνος διαιρεῖται καὶ τὸ 
μέγεθος. […] καὶ εἰ ὁποτερονοῦν ἄπειρον, καὶ θάτερον, καὶ ὡς θάτερον, καὶ 
θάτερον […] 
         διὸ καὶ ὁ Ζήνωνος λόγος ψεῦδος λαμβάνει τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τὰ ἄπειρα 
διελθεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι τῶν ἀπείρων καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ. διχῶς 
γὰρ λέγεται καὶ τὸ μῆκος καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἄπειρον, καὶ ὅλως πᾶν τὸ συνεχές, ἤτοι 
κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. τῶν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀπείρων οὐκ 
ἐνδέχεται ἅψασθαι ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ, τῶν δὲ κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἐνδέχεται· 
καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος οὕτως ἄπειρος. ὥστε ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ 
πεπερασμένῳ συμβαίνει διιέναι τὸ ἄπειρον, καὶ ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἀπείρων τοῖς 
ἀπείροις, οὐ τοῖς πεπερασμένοις. οὔτε δὴ τὸ ἄπειρον οἷόν τε ἐν πεπερασμένῳ 
χρόνῳ διελθεῖν, οὔτ’ ἐν ἀπείρῳ τὸ πεπερασμένον· ἀλλ’ ἐάν τε ὁ χρόνος 
ἄπειρος ᾖ, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἔσται ἄπειρον, ἐάν τε τὸ μέγεθος, καὶ ὁ χρόνος.  
 
And since every magnitude is divisible into magnitudes […] it necessarily fol-
lows that the faster of two things traverses a greater magnitude in an equal 
time, an equal magnitude in less time, and even a greater magnitude in less 
time, in conformity with the definition sometimes given of the faster. […] 
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By continuous I mean that which is divisible into divisibles that are 
always further divisible: and if we take this as the definition of continuous, it 
follows necessarily that time is continuous. For since it has been shown that 
the faster will pass over an equal magnitude in less time than the slower, sup-
pose that A is faster and B slower, and that the slower has traversed the mag-
nitude ΓΔ in the time ZH. Now it is clear that the faster will traverse the same 
magnitude in less time than this: let us say in the time ΖΘ. Again, since the 
faster has passed over the whole ΓΔ in the time ΖΘ, the slower will in the 
same time pass over ΓK, say, which is less than ΓΔ. And since B, the slower, 
has passed over ΓK in the time ΖΘ, the faster will pass over it in less time: so 
that the time ΖΘ will again be divided. And if this is divided the magnitude 
ΓK will also be divided according to the same rule: and again, if the magni-
tude is divided, the time will also be divided. […] the faster will divide the 
time and the slower will divide the length. If, then, this alternation always 
holds good, and at every turn involves a division, it is evident that all time 
must be continuous. And at the same time it is clear that all magnitude is also 
continuous; for the divisions of which time and magnitude respectively are 
susceptible are the same and equal. […] And if either is infinite, so is the oth-
er, and the one is so in the same way as the other […] 
Hence Zeno's argument makes a false assumption in asserting that it is 
impossible for a thing to pass over or severally to come in contact with infi-
nite things in a finite time. For there are two senses in which length and time 
and generally anything continuous are called 'infinite': they are called so either 
in respect of divisibility or in respect of their extremities. So while a thing in a 
finite time cannot come in contact with things quantitatively infinite, it can 
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come in contact with things infinite in respect of divisibility: for in this sense 
the time itself is also infinite; and so we find that the time occupied by the 
passage over the infinite is not a finite but an infinite time, and the contact 
with the infinites is made by means of moments not finite but infinite in num-
ber. The passage over the infinite, then, cannot occupy a finite time, and the 
passage over the finite cannot occupy an infinite time: if the time is infinite 
the magnitude must be infinite also, and if the magnitude is infinite, so also is 
the time” (translation by Hardie and Gaye with alterations). 
 
The first paragraph of the second chapter states that (a) what is faster moves in the 
same time over more magnitude,
90
 and (b) in less time over the same or (c) even more 
magnitude.
91
 In the second paragraph a faster and a slower motion are compared. And 
it turns out that if we compare the two, the slower always divides the magnitude 
while the faster divides time: The slower has traversed the magnitude ΓΔ in the time 
ZH; the quicker – let us assume it moves twice as fast as the slower one – will then 
traverse the same magnitude in half the time:
 
 
 
Γ   Ξ   M          K                Δ   distance 
–––3––2––––– 1–––––––––– 
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 Since Aristotle wants to give a general account of a kinêsis being faster than anoth-
er, he literally only talks about the faster moving “in the same time over more”, etc. 
Hardie and Gaye add that the faster is moving over more “magnitude”; for our pur-
poses we can focus on locomotion and understand the more that is covered as more 
“distance” or “spatial extension”. 
91
 Cf. H. Mendell, “Two traces of a Two-Step Eudoxian Proportion Theory in Aristo-
tle: a Tale of Definitions in Aristotle, with a Moral”, Archive for History of Exact Sci-
ences 61 [Proportion Theory] (2007), pp. 3-37 for a discussion of these three claims, 
their relations, their status, and the problems they raise as possible definitions of “be-
ing faster”. Mendell concludes that what we get here are “three necessary conditions 
for showing that A is faster than B under different conditions” (p. 22).     
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Z   N    L          Θ               H   time 
–––3––2––––– 1–––––––––– 
 
The slower body will divide the distance – in time ZH the faster has covered distance 
ΓΔ, but the slower has only covered ΓK. The faster body will divide the time – in or-
der to cover ΓK the slower will need the time ZH, while the faster will only need time 
ΖΘ.   
This comparison of two bodies moving with different speed shows that time 
and distance are divisible as much as one likes. There is a constant rule of division 
which stays the same as long as the speed stays the same.
92
 While the rule of division 
stays the same, the time and distance investigated vary, since both are always further 
divided according to the different speeds of the things in motion. The current size of 
the relata, that is, of the respective pieces of time and space, is not relevant (we start 
out looking at the magnitude of size ΓΔ, but then we turn to the magnitude of half the 
size, of size ΓK, etc.).  
This example of two bodies moving with different speed leads Aristotle to one 
of his aims of argumentation, namely that time and distance can be divided as much 
as one likes, there are no indivisible parts. The way he proves this, however, proves 
even more: he shows that with respect to motion, time and distance are divided in the 
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 Mendell, Proportion Theory 12 n.16 points out that throughout Physics Z Aristotle 
does not need constant speed; rather the weaker notion of uniform periodicity (that is, 
if “a movement over a distance divided into equal distances (periods), every equal 
distance traveled is traveled in an equal time”) is sufficient. I think this is right for the 
passages Mendell explicitly names as examples (233b4–5 and 233b26–7). However, 
in order to solve Zeno’s motion paradox, where we deal with infinite divisibility, it 
seems to me that mere uniform periodicity would not guarantee that the ratio or rule 
of division would always stay the same, no matter where we cut (moreover, the usage 
of “aiei” (always) in our passage suggests that Aristotle uses uniform motion here). 
Also T. Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle (Oxford 1949), 129 assumes constant speed. 
And in book IV, 222b30-223a4 Aristotle explicitly talks about uniform motion 
(ὁμαλὴν κίνησιν) when comparing two motions of different speed. 
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very same way, “the divisions of time and of magnitude will be the same”; they are 
divided kata ton auton logon, “according to the same ratio” or “according to the same 
rule”.93 When comparing different speeds, time and distance can vary in getting as 
small as one likes, we can always divide them further – this is what Aristotle wants to 
prove. In addition, he thereby shows that the only thing that stays constant is the spe-
cific relation of time and distance of each motion. For example, we may think that the 
slower body will cover one unit of space in two units of time, while the faster body 
will cover one unit of space in one unit of time; then the relationship of one spatial 
unit per two temporal ones for the slower motion and the relationship of one spatial 
unit per one temporal unit for the faster motion will stay the same, no matter how far 
we divide time and distance. If we want to measure the speed of the two motions, we 
have to measure these relations. It is this very relation that provides Aristotle’s main 
argument against what we called the ‘motion problem’ of Zeno’s paradox, as we will 
see in the next section. 
  
5.1.3 Implications for solving Zeno’s Dichotomy Paradox 
In order to explain why the relation between time and distance that Aristotle employs 
helps to solve the motion problem we have to remember that Zeno’s paradox showed 
motion to require infinitely many spatial parts to be passed in a finite time – an im-
possible undertaking, since a finite time seems to be too short to cover something in-
finite. Accordingly, the finite time cannot be correlated with the infinitely many spa-
tial parts.  
The idea that motion requires infinitely many spatial parts to be passed in a fi-
nite time rests, however, on an implicit assumption that Aristotle in this second chap-
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 For logos qua “rule” cf. LSJ logos 2.d: “rule, principle, law, as embodying the re-
sult of λογισμός”, which we find as early as Pindar, and also in Plato and Aristotle. 
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ter of book VI proves wrong, namely that each division of the distance covered, 
which leads to infinitely many parts, does not entail an equal division of time. Zeno 
does not divide the time of a motion whenever he divides its space – the distance to 
be covered in the paradox gets divided ad infinitum and so each part gets smaller and 
smaller, but the time is not divided and thus stays finite. Given this ad infinitum divi-
sion of the distance, it seems that the infinitely many parts could at best be covered in 
an infinitely extended time. Such an inference can, however, only be drawn if we do 
not sufficiently distinguish between infinity of division and infinity of extension; the 
former is employed with respect to distance, but the latter seems to be required with 
respect to time. But even if the runner of the dichotomy paradox had indeed an infi-
nitely extended time available (if, for example, we asked immortal Apollo to do the 
run for us), we would still be caught in a paradox, since the infinitely many spatial 
parts are the parts of a finitely extended distance, which could not be paired with an 
infinitely extended time. 
So the problem really is that Zeno does not divide the time of a motion when-
ever he divides the distance covered. Otherwise, Zeno would have needed to put the 
division somewhat like this: first the runner has to cover half the racing course in half 
the time. But before he can do that, he first has to cover half of this half, that is, a 
quarter of the race course, in half of the half time, that is, in a quarter of the time, and 
so on ad infinitum: 
 
Γ   Ξ    M         K                 Δ    distance 
–––3––2–––––1–––––––––– 
 
Z   N     L         Θ                H    time  
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–––3––2––––– 1–––––––––– 
 
We see that this is exactly the relation Aristotle employed when comparing two mo-
tions of different speed – each division of the distance covered by a motion leads to 
an equal division of the time taken. The fact that distance and time have to be divided 
by the same rule frees us from the problem that the infinitely many spatial parts can-
not be related to a finite time (or the finite extension of the distance cannot be related 
to an infinitely extended time, respectively). Time and spatial magnitude are infinite 
in the very same sense – they are infinitely divisible. 
 Showing that the same kind of infinity has to be ascribed to both time and dis-
tance can thus solve the motion problem – as Aristotle demonstrates in the last para-
graph of the long passage just quoted:  
διὸ καὶ ὁ Ζήνωνος λόγος ψεῦδος λαμβάνει τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τὰ ἄπειρα 
διελθεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι τῶν ἀπείρων καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ. διχῶς 
γὰρ λέγεται καὶ τὸ μῆκος καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἄπειρον, καὶ ὅλως πᾶν τὸ συνεχές, ἤτοι 
κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. τῶν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀπείρων οὐκ 
ἐνδέχεται ἅψασθαι ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ, τῶν δὲ κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἐνδέχεται· 
καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος οὕτως ἄπειρος. ὥστε ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ 
πεπερασμένῳ συμβαίνει διιέναι τὸ ἄπειρον 
 
Hence Zeno's argument makes a false assumption in asserting that it is impos-
sible for a thing to pass over or severally to come in contact with infinite 
things in a finite time. For there are two senses in which length and time and 
generally anything continuous are called 'infinite': they are called so either in 
respect of divisibility or in respect of their extremities. So while a thing in a 
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finite time cannot come in contact with things quantitatively infinite, it can 
come in contact with things infinite in respect of divisibility: for in this sense 
the time itself is also infinite: and so we find that the time occupied by the 
passage over the infinite is not a finite but an infinite time (233a21-30).  
 
Both time and distance covered are infinite in the sense of being divisible ad infini-
tum – a feature of their continuous structure. According to Aristotle, this very struc-
ture allows us to connect time and distance, for example when conceptualising speed. 
If we look at Plato’s Timaeus we see that such a connection of time and space is not 
just a matter of course – there it is unclear how two entities of such different charac-
teristics and ontological status as time and space, Plato’s chôra, can be consistently 
combined in such a way as to determine speed.
94
 
And Aristotle goes even further in his comparison of different speeds: not on-
ly can time and distance be divided in the very same way, since they are both infinite-
ly divisible, they also have to be divided according to the same ratio or rule, since the 
one will be divided according to the other with regard to a certain motion. Every divi-
sion of the distance covered leads necessarily to a division of the time taken, and vice 
versa (232b26-233a5).
95
 Accordingly, it cannot be the case that the one is infinite 
while the other is not (cf. also 233a34-b15).  
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 For the problems Plato’s Timaeus raises for an account of speed see my Motion, 
chapter 6; for a discussion of why I think Plato’s chôra is closer to a notion of space 
than of matter, see my “A Likely Account of Necessity, Plato’s Receptacle as a Phys-
ical and Metaphysical Basis of Space”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (2012), 
159-195.  
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 However, time and distance are only dependent on each with respect to the specific 
motion in question. Different motions require different relationships between them, as 
we saw with the two different motions Aristotle is comparing in his Physics – in the 
way sketched above, the faster motion was characterized by the relationship of one 
unit of space per one unit of time, while the slower motion was characterized by the 
relationship of one unit of space per two units of time. 
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Although the dichotomy paradox does not explicitly deal with measurement, it 
deals with the quantitative aspect of motion and thus with an area falling under the 
domain of a measure. And the relationship of time and distance we saw Aristotle em-
ploy in his reaction to this paradox is also what is required for measuring motion, as 
when we measure motion as km/h.  
 
5.2 Aristotle’s explicit conception of the measure of motion  
When dealing with Zeno’s paradoxes, Aristotle obviously uses the relation of time 
and distance to determine and measure motion. And at the beginning of the long 
Physics passage quote, he understands faster in a way that also takes into account 
time and distance: “the faster of two things traverses a greater magnitude in an equal 
time, an equal magnitude in less time, and even a greater magnitude in less time, in 
conformity with the definition sometimes given of the faster”. So he (and those peo-
ple who gave this definition of faster)
96
 clearly take distance and time into account 
when talking about being faster. Thus we may think that Aristotle in fact understands 
distance as a measure of motion in determining whether something is faster. And 
there are other passages where we read that motion is long if the distance is, and dis-
tance, if motion is.
97
 If we look at Aristotle’s explicit definition of the measure of mo-
tion, however, we see that he never explicitly calls distance a measure of motion and, 
more importantly, distance is not integrated into a complex measure that would allow 
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 See below. 
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 220b28-31: “καὶ μετροῦμεν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῇ. κινήσει καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τῷ 
μεγέθει· πολλὴν γὰρ εἶναί 
φαμεν τὴν ὁδόν, ἂν ἡ πορεία πολλή, καὶ ταύτην πολλήν, ἂν ἡ ὁδὸς [ᾖ] πολλή·” (“And 
we measure both the distance by the movement and the movement by the distance; 
for we say that the road is long, if the journey is long, and that this is long, if the road 
is long”). However, it is not speed that is measured here, how fast a motion is, but the 
length of motion. 
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us to measure how fast a motion is. For the measure of motion Aristotle explicitly 
only takes time into account: 
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι 
Time is a measure of motion and of being moved (220b32-221a1). 
 
And more precisely,  
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον 
For this is time – number of motion in respect of before and after (219b1-2).98 
 
Time as the number of motion has to be understood as the number resulting from 
measurement, that is, time serves for quantifying one aspect of motion – it tells us 
how long a motion has lasted. But is time really enough to measure motion? Does 
time on its own actually fulfil the four criteria of a measure named in the Metaphys-
ics? 
The first criterion, to quantify motion, seems to be fulfilled in some sense by 
time alone. As for the units of measurement and their indivisibility either in quantity 
or quality, which we took to be Aristotle’s third criterion, it seems to be clear that Ar-
istotle uses units indivisible in quantity, that is, units indivisible for perception, like 
days.
99
 As for precision, the fourth criterion, for our eyes temporal units were not ter-
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 While most scholars do not think that Aristotle makes a distinction between time as 
number and time as measure of motion in the Physics, some have taken these two ac-
counts of time, as number and as measure, to be significantly different, cf., for exam-
ple, P. Conen, Die Zeittheorie des Aristoteles (München 1964) and R. Sorabji, Time, 
Creation and the Continuum. Theories in antiquity and the early middle ages (Lon-
don 1983). Coope, Time, even argues that time is defined only as a number, not as a 
measure. For a full discussion of the position of these scholars and an account why I 
think we have to understand time qua number and time qua measure as expressing the 
same notion see my Motion, chapter 8. 
99
 We may originally have assumed that just as the concept “rational animal” is indi-
visible, so is the concept of motion; hence we would work with units indivisible in 
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ribly precise in ancient Greece, given the ancient measurement tools (mainly sun and 
water clocks).  
What is really problematic, however, is the homogeneity criterion, Aristotle’s 
second criterion, since time seems to be a dimension different from motion. Thus, 
time would be a measure homogenous with the motion to be measured in case we 
wanted to measure only the duration of a motion. But we have seen above that Aristo-
tle does not only try to determine the duration of a motion, but its being faster and 
slower. Aristotle’s interest in the speed of motion is confirmed by a passage in the 
context of his explicit definition of time as the measure of motion:  
 
φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσα μεταβολὴ καὶ ἅπαν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ. τὸ γὰρ θᾶττον  
καὶ βραδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσάν ἐστιν μεταβολήν (ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ οὕτω φαίνεται)· 
λέγω δὲ θᾶττον κινεῖσθαι τὸ πρότερον μεταβάλλον εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατὰ τὸ 
αὐτὸ διάστημα καὶ ὁμαλὴν κίνησιν κινούμενον 
[…] it is evident that every change and everything that moves is in time; for 
the faster and slower exist in reference to all change, since it is found in every 
instance. I say that moves faster that changes before another into the condition 
in question, when it moves over the same interval and with a regular move-
ment (222b30-223a2). 
 
Similarly, in the long passage from the Physics quoted above we saw that Aristotle 
determines being faster as moving in less time over the same distance or in the same 
time over more distance. Measuring speed, measuring that something is faster or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
eidos. However, with the help of such units we could only find out what belongs to 
the concept of motion, that is, what is a motion and what is not a motion, and thus 
count the number of motions in a given context and probably of moving things. But 
we could not quantify an individual motion. 
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slower, thus cannot be reduced to measuring the duration of a motion. And a simple 
example can confirm that: Let us assume we want to compare who is faster, Achilles 
or the tortoise, and we suppose that Achilles runs 100 metres in 10 seconds and the 
tortoise moves 2 metres in 2 seconds. If we thought we could measure how fast their 
respective motions are by measuring only the time each motion takes without taking 
into account the distance covered, it would mean that the tortoise is faster than Achil-
les: the tortoise finishes her run in 2 seconds and thus much earlier than Achilles, who 
takes 10 seconds for his course; if we disregard the distance we cannot account for 
the fact that Achilles covers a much bigger distance during this 10 seconds than the 
tortoise does in her 2 seconds, and that it would take her 100 seconds to cover the 
same distance.  
This example only stresses a point obvious from the quotation of the Physics, 
namely that distance is an essential element in order to account for speed. According-
ly, time is only understood as “something of motion” (“ὁ χρόνος […] τί τῆς κινήσεώς 
ἐστιν”, 219a2-3). This seems to show that Aristotle himself realises that the homoge-
neity criterion with respect to measuring the full quantity of motion cannot be met by 
time alone, as this criterion demands that a measure, which is homogeneous with the 
measurand, is (I repeat the quotation from above) “of magnitudes a magnitude, and in 
particular of length a length, of breadth a breadth, of sounds a sound, of weights a 
weight”, and now of motion – a time.  
We see that the measure of motion confronts Aristotle with a dilemma in 
which he has to choose between two requirements of his measurement account, (a) 
simplicity and (b) homogeneity: (a) either he endorses the implicit requirement of the 
Metaphysics that the measure has to be simple in the sense of one-dimensional – then 
the measure of motion is solely time. This measure, however, does not fit the homo-
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geneity requirement if he wants to measure more than the duration of a motion. It 
makes it impossible to determine how fast a motion is, and will get him into trouble 
when he attempts to compare two motions of different speed. (b) Or Aristotle em-
ploys a complex measure of motion, which takes into account time as well as distance 
covered. Such a measure is homogenous with the measurand if we want to measure 
how fast it is. But it will go against the implicit simplicity requirement of the Meta-
physics. And it is unclear how Aristotle could in fact conceptualise a complex meas-
ure – there is no explicit example for a complex measure in the Aristotelian corpus.    
Contemporary measurement theory usually opts for (b) homogeneity.
100
 As 
for Aristotle, we saw that he uses a complex measure when dealing with Zeno’s para-
doxes and when giving an account of a thing being faster than another; thus he seems 
to have a clear understanding of a complex measure. However, in his explicit account 
of what he calls the measure of motion, he seems to opt for the first horn of this di-
lemma, for (a), simplicity. As it is clear that he runs into severe problems when giv-
ing an account of the measure of motion only in terms of one simple dimension, 
while he has a way to avoid them, he must have some serious reasons for sticking to 
time as a simple, one-dimensional measure. And it is indeed certain assumptions from 
his metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics (some of the latter were briefly men-
tioned above) that let him go down this route, as I have tried to show elsewhere.
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But even if Aristotle ends up in a dilemma, his accounts of measurement in 
the Physics as well as in the Metaphysics provide us with the first systematic discus-
sion of measurement relevant for natural philosophy we find in ancient Greek think-
                                                          
100
 At least for the cases of interest for our purpose, and, in any case, there is no sim-
plicity requirement. 
101
 See Motion, chapter 9. 
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ing.
102
 For natural philosophy a measure is one important way how the perceptible 
world can be connected with mathematical structures and how perceptible properties 
can be, as we would call it, “represented” faithfully by numerical properties. Aristo-
tle’s discussion of measuring motion in the Physics may have been part of a larger 
debate on the conceptualisation of speed at his time, which Aristotle seems to refer to 
in the first paragraph of the long Physics passage quoted above.
103
 Mendell, Propor-
tion Theory, 21 suggests that it may refer to Eudoxus’ influential but unfortunately 
lost treatise peri tachôn or to Archytas. We may thus also get a glimpse of a discus-
sion of speed at the time which otherwise seems to be lost. And we see the important 
use Aristotle puts this understanding of speed to – in his fight against Zeno. Finally, 
even though Aristotle’s explicit account of measurement in Metaphysics Iota cannot 
deal with complex measures, such as speed, we saw that in some way it already em-
ployed implicitly the most important features on which also a modern theories of 
measurement (for all its differences in formulation and perspective) rests.
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